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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on indirect discrimination against women in employment.
It briefly examines the causes of discrimination against women in the workplace.
Further it explains the concept of indirect discrimination by tracing its origins in the
United States of America and analyses the development of the law of indirect
discrimination in the United States until the introduction of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. This analysis involves an examination of the elements involved in proving an
indirect discrimination claim and the problems experienced in doing so. The British
indirect discrimination laws and cases are then examined to the extent to which
Britain deviates from the American approach. The comparative law discussion will
indicate the problems that have become an inherent feature of indirect discrimination
cases. The problematic nature of proving indirect discrimination necessitates a
discussion of the common types of conditions and requirements that indirectly
discriminate against women. It is against this background that the present South
African legislation on indirect discrimination in employment is analysed and case
developments reviewed. Finally, the proposals of the Green Paper on Employment
Equity are examined. The recommendations for the introduction of a comprehensive
discrimination statute; the introduction of an independent commission; and the
formulation of a Code of Good Practice that will provide guidelines to employers, are
supported. Further, recommendations are made for a flexible discrimination legislation
that provides a broad legal framework which allows for development of the law; the
necessity to address issues regarding administration and costs involved in
implementing this legislation; the introduction of additional funtions of the
independent commission relating to training and access to the law; and the adoption
of a statutorily enforced affirmative action policy that addresses the inequalities faced
by women in employment.
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Discrimination against a group of people on account of some shared characteristic, such as
sex, race, colour or age, often takes a subtle form. By reason of historical facts or ingrained
attitudes, rules and practices which, upon their face, make no distinction between different
groups of people - -facially neutral", in the American terminology - may have the effect of
operating unfairly upon a particular group. In such a case a disadvantage may be visited
upon members of that group which is not the less real because it is indirect, unintended and
. , 1
even unwrttmq,
Discrimination is a long and well-established feature of the employment
rstationship." Yet the impetus towards the introduction of antidiscriminatory
legislation has occurred only relatively recently. Even more recent is the
appearance of the concept of indirect discrimination in the legislative and judicial
arenas."
Indirect discrimination" is often inaccurately viewed as a mere expansion of the
concept of direct discrimination and therefore a lesser evil that does not warrant
legislative or judicial attention. Also often regarded as a lesser evil, especially in
the South African context, is the issue of sex and gender discrimination." The
1 Wilcox J, Styles v Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(1988) 84 AiR 408 at 421.
2 Painter R.W & Puttick K Employment Rights (1993) at 118 (hereafter Painter
& Puttick). .
3 Indirect discrimination or adverse impact discrimination as it is known in the
United States was first formulated by the US Supreme Court in the landmark
judgement of Griggs v Duke Power Co. 401 US 424 (1971).
4 Indirect discrimination occurs when an employer applies a particular rule or
requirement to all its employees, the effect of which is that one group is
disadvantaged by this application. "Indirect discrimination thus consists of
acts or practices which are fair in form but unequal in impact... "(see Painter
& Puttick (1993) at 134.)
5 Sex discrimination is based on the biological differences that exists between
males and females. Whereas gender discrimination is based on the
psychological and cultural characteristics that are attached to men and
women because they belong to these different groups in society.
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legacy of the apartheid system, in heightening our awareness of racial
discrimination, has had the unfortunate effect of absorbing any significant reaction
to discrimination based on sex and gender.
Therefore although the removal of apartheid and the creation of a society based
on democratic values has resulted in the lifting of the more obvious barriers
preventing previously disadvantaged groups from gaining a measure of equality in
the labour market, "subtle barriers remain which are not less real for being harder
to detect by victims and perpetrators alike". 6 It is, in fact, naive to expect a ban
on discrimination , an insistence on neutral or identical treatment, to alter the
grossly disproportionate representation of the dominant group in the higher strata
of society substantially."
This work focuses on the "glass cellinqs'" that continue to prevent women from
gaining any measure of equality in employment.
The interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 provided for a "historic
bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife,
conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development
opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or
sex." This "historic bridge" will not be able to achieve its aim of establishing a
6 Hunter R Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace (1992) at xxi.
7 Meyerson 0 "How useful is the concept of racial discrimination" cited in
Heyns C, Van der Westhuizen J and Mayimele-Hashatse T (eds)
Discrimination and the Law in South Africa Vol 1 (1994) at 14. This was
also clearly evidenced in a report in the Pretoria News, " Whites still getting
top jobs, big money" ,on the 17 March 1997, which indicated that a study
conducted by the University of Cape Town's Breakwater Monitor revealed
that despite affirmative action programmes whites occupied 96% of top
management positions as compared to Africans who occupied only 3% of
such positions.
8 Hunter (1992) at xxi.
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society "based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights"9 if discriminatory practices against women that are not direct in nature are
allowed to continue unchecked in the employment arena. In a country that has
most recently become sensitive to issues of direct discrimination, it is therefore
necessary to ensure that indirectly discriminatory practices are not allowed to go
unchecked in the workplace. This is because discrimination in employment will
have a ripple effect on the economic and social fibre of South African society.
Work confers income, social relationships and status which influence life chances and
lifestyles in every other social sphere. Factors which restrict equal opportunity in the labour
market for specific individuals or groups affect their social position outside work as well.'o
It is therefore necessary to examine the causes of indirect discrimination based on
gender and sex in employment. It is only with an understanding of the social
dynamics of this problem that any comprehensive study on indirect discrimination
against women is possible.
2 CAUSES OF INDIRECTDISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN
EMPLOYMENT
Although it is true that discrimination in employment has a ripple effect on society,
it is also true that employment practices often mirror social practices. In George v
Liberty Life Assosciation of Africa Ltd the court stated that "the workplace
mirroring the broader community bears the fruits of the legacy of racial
9 Preamble to The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of
(1996).
10 Hunter (1992) at xxii citing Castles, Morrissey & Pinkstone Migrant
Employment and Training and Industry Restructuring (1989) at 127.
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discrtrninatlon".!' The same can be said of sex and gender discrimination.
Discriminatory employment practices are a manifestation of prejudicial patterns of behaviour
.• 11 12In society genera y.
Commenting on this quote, Lord Wedderburn in The Worker and the Law states
that It •••many workers bring to their subordinate status as employees additionaJ
disadvantages that derive from discrimination against them in the wider
societv.r " Therefore the discrimination experienced by women in ' the
employment sector is often a ltmanifestation" of the discrimination experienced by
the female population in society generally.
The subordinate status of women in society can be attributed to a significant
extent to stereotyping. St~~ot'iP}_ng initially arose because of the biological
differences between men and women. Because of these biological differences,
society imposed different roles on the different sexes. This sexual stereotyping
was then reinforced over time by the manner in which parents reared their
children, such as by encouraging and reinforcing acceptable and appropriate
ltmale" and ltfemale" behaviour. Because of this parental reinforcement,
stereotyping cannot be regarded as exclusively a sex issue. Through effective
cultural conditioning, it became a gender issue as well.
According to Carol Louw in her thesis, Sex Discrimination in Employment this
cultural conditioning is then reinforced in our schools and inevitably plays a
significant role in the level and nature of education that women receive. 14
11 (1996) 17 ILJ 571 (IC) at 590 D-E.
12 Lord Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 3ed (1986) at 447
citing Smith A, Craver C and Clark L Employment Discrimination Law 2ed
(1982) at 1.
13 Lord Wedderburn (1986) at 447.
14 Louw C Sex Discrimination In Employment (doctoral thesis) (1992) at 35.
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The social stereotyping of the male as the breadwinner and the female as child-
rearer and responsible for domestic tasks has produced significant consequences
in education. Firstly, the number of women who have received any formal
educational qualifications and training is grossly disproportionate to the number of
males possessing these qualifications. 15 This can be attributed to the fact that in
patriarchal societies like South Africa;" parents react to social conditioning make
plans for the careers of their sons and not for their daughters. Secondly, the nature
of the education received differs. Even when plans for the education of girls are
considered, the nature of the education that is received by boys and girls differs.
Girls selecting a field of study at school tend to prefer the humanities or more .literary
branches to the sciences or more technical fields. But employment within the latter areas
(for example, engineers, chemists and technicians) would help to raise women to a higher
level within the occcupational hierachy. 17
The need to reorganise education and training in order to achieve occupational
equality has been proposed and implemented as a labour and social policy in many
countries. 18 However, equal education opportunity programmes often operate on
the premise that the female working population will achieve equality if women are
given the opportunity to receive education and training in male dominated careers.
These programmes often ignore the fact that a majority of women will continue to
choose traditionally female orientated career paths. The reason for this may lie in
the argument that the mainstream of women are better suited for these
occupations or, ironically that women themselves have internalised the effects of
15 Louw (1992) at 25 states that a Financial Mail report on the 13 July 1990
at 23 indicated that "differences in education account for approximately
75 % of the occupational differences between men and women in South
Africa."
16 Louw (1992) at 8.
17 Ibid at 25.
18 D
iscrimination in education is prohibited in the UK by the 1975 Sex
Discrimination Act and in the US by means of Title IX of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.
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social stereotyping and therefore continue to choose traditionally female-dominated
career paths.
Therefore the question that must be asked at this stage is whether the position of
male-dominated careers at the top of the occupational hierachy is due to a correct
and unbiased evaluation of these jobs as more beneficial to society or whether
their position has more to do with the sexual composition of these careers groups.
The labour market has a tendency to value -looking after material assets rather
than looking after people, physical effort over mental effort, the possession of
formal credentials over the possession of qualifications developed outside formal
avenues.. .".19 It is imperative that this value system be reconsidered. This will
involve a massive undertaking to re-evaluate careers without the influence of
sexually prejudicial social values.
It is a given fact that educational qualifications play a significant role in
determining the position occupied by women in employment. However, the
combination of educational inequalities and sex and gender stereotyping has
resulted in a distinct and undeniable segregation of jobs on the basis of sex.
Because of society's perception of women as primarily care-givers and responsible
for domestic tasks, women have found themselves predominantly in jobs that are
merely an extension of their socially appointed roles. For example, nursing,
cooking and cleaning. 20
Jobs of this nature are perceived as intrinsic to womanhood and therefore not necessary of being
learned in the manner in which male skills at work need to be learned. 2 1
19 Hunter (1992) at 172.
20 Louw (1992) at 31.
21 Ibid.
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Carol Louw comments that what is understood by ·skill" is determined by male
perceptions. " The predominance of this male perception has resulted in the
undervaluing of typically female-dominated jobs. This has had the effect of
positioning women in low paying jobs which lack stability and advancement by
promotion. These "lower pay structures reinforce the stereotype by making it less
costly for women to remain at home than for men to do so..".23
The effects of social conditioning are numerous. Women are taught from an early
age "that paid work should not interfere with domesticity and child-rearing". 24
Therefore women often enter the labour market at a much later age than men once
they believe they have fulfilled their child care responsibilities. Women then find
themselves in a position where they are competing with males of the same age
group with years of experience, education and training. This late entrance into the
labour market limits the potential of women to attain employment positions that
offer high salaries and good prospects for advancement.
Social perceptions of women are also reinforced in the employment world by the
employer who offers mainly part-time low wage employment to women and by
women who in attempting to fulfil their social role are unable to conform to the
"traditional working model in terms of time". 25 Thus the social allocation of
women to the role of child rearing and domestic responsibilites has limited the
potential of women to enter the labour market on a full -time basis. This has
resulted in a concentration of women in part-time employment. Prospects of
promotion in part-time employment are then severely restricted by a career
structure which is based on the "male worker" model which assumes a continuous
paid working life.
22 Ibid.




A further significant consequence of stereotyping is the predominance and
perpetuation of the male norm in the employment sector. The majority of women
have found the working world to be a "hostile place". 26 Sandra Fredman in her
article European Community Discrimination Law : A Critique reasons that the
dominance of the male norm in employment is responsible for the creation and
maintenance of this hostile environment for women in the workplace. The
perpetuation of dominant male norms has had a significant impact on the role of
women in society and hence has limited the role of women in employment."
Rosemary Hunter in Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace refers to this as
"structural" or "institutional" discrlrnination." which "arises from the fact that
organisational norms, rules and procedures, used to determine the allocation of
positions and benefits, have generally been designed, whether deliberately or
unreflectively, around the behaviour patterns and attributes of the historically
dominant group in public life". 29 This has had a significant impact on the pattern
of the working life of women.
The perpetuation of the male norm in employment has created certain perceptions
amongst employers as to what constitutes a successful employee. It has been said
that:
Working patterns in the labour market are structured according to the expectation that
workers will work full-time for a continuous period from school-leaving age to retirement.
Many important benefits flow from conforming to this pattern, including pay increments,
senior ity rights, training and pension benefits; and any diversion from the pattern is highly
penalized in these respects.
26 Campanella J "Sex Discrimination"(1990) Vol 7 No 1 Employment La~ 78
at 78.
27
Fredman S "European Community Law: A Critique" (1992) Vol 21 No 21LJ
(UK) 119 at 119.
28 Hunter (1992) at 4.
29 Ibid at 5.
9
The central assumption , then, is that domestic and family needs will be taken care of
outside of the market. The paradigm worker is the married man whose wife works unpaid
in the home, at least for part of her time, looking after children or the elderly and doing
domestic work.30
Therefore instead of rewarding women for their role in the creation and rearing of
future society, women are seen as lacking commitment and seriousness to work.
This problem as been formulated as follows:
... for whatever reason, whether biologically-based inclination, or social pressures, Of the
distinctive features of our parenting system, women devote much more of their energy than
men to looking after their homes and families, tasks our society has historically undervalued
and failed to reward. Furthermore, the burden of this unpaid form of labour, this 'shadow
work', combines with the inadequacy of child-care facilities and the expectation of
employers that employees should have no family commitments of a kind to interfere with
full-time work to make women more risky to employ, and to make it vastly more difficult
for those who do have the same career expectations as men to compete for the jobs which
society does reward."
The reference to child-rearing and domestic responsibilities as "shadow work" is
accurate as these traditionally female duties are shadowed by society's perception
that the "real" work is performed outside the home by predominantly males.
There are also assumptions that women are not ambitious because they value child
care responsibilites. Employers perceive women as "inevitably about to leave or
limit their paid work for children,,32. Women are also stereotyped as primarily
dependent on a male breadwinner. This has had the effect of limiting the potential
of women to earn high salaries and attain advancement in the labour market.
30 Ibid at 120-121.
31 Meyerson D "Sexual Equality and the Law" (1993) Vol 9 Part 2 SAJHR
237 at 251.
32 Hepple B & Szyszczak E.M (eds) Discrimination: The Limits of Law (1992)
at 218.
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Hepple and Szyszczak go on to say:
Clearly these limitations will vary between white women and women from diffferent ethnic
groups, as well as between women with actual domestic responsibilities and those without.
But all women, regardless of their real responsibilities are limited by assumptions that
women are primarily child-bearers and rearers."
Thus this social conditioning has followed women into the employment arena and
resulted in the creation of certain perceptions of women as employees. Employers,
whether consciously or sub-consciuosly, apply these social perceptions of women
in the workplace. In South Africa and elsewhere, the effects of inflation and
economic distress has necessitated the appearance of a dual income family unit.
Furthermore due to an increase in divorce rates and pregnancies out of wedlock,
women have found themselves in the position of the primary br.eadwinner of the
family. However, despite the economic factor and the significant changes in social
patterns, women continue to be inhibited in employment by stereotyped
assumptions of their role in society.
Perhaps one of the most significant reasons why indirectly discriminatory practices
in employment are not identified as being "wrong" either in the social or the legal
context is that prejudices against women have been allowed to flourish in society.
This has inevitably led to a situation where such social perceptions and prejudices
against women have, firstly, been regarded by society as a whole as normal
behaviour and, secondly, and most arlarmingly, by women, as acceptable.
If the social "status quo is maintained then the built-in inequalities will be
perpetuated in the workplace". 34 However, the concept of indirect discrimination
does not claim to provide the impetus towards a social revolution in the manner
in which women are perceived and treated in society. It instead questions the
33 Ibid.
34 George v Liberty Life Assosciation Of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 571 (le) at
590 F.
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infiltration of these social perceptions into the employment sector and their effect
on employment practices. It has been observed that:
Indirect discrimination goes some way towards acknowledging the problematic dominance
of the male norm. Recognizing that certain practices obstruct the free entry of women into
the labour force, indirect discrimination addresses situations in which employment practices
or conditions, although treating both sexes alike in the formal sense, have the effect of
excluding more women than men.
35
But does indirect discrimination legislation go one step further by aiming to achieve
equality for women in the workplace? And if so, what measure of equality ishoped
for?
3 THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY
Traditionally, antidiscrimination legislation was directed at outlawing direct
discrimination and aimed at achieving equality in the workplace. However, the
model of equality that was envisaged was based on the principle that everyone in
the same situation should be treated identically, that is, they should all be treated
on their individual merits without regard to their sex, colour, political beliefs etc. 36
In short, "sexual equality will be guaranteed when the law is sex-blind". 37
The formal equality model has been severely criticised with regards to the law on
indirect discrimination. This model concentrates on ignoring the differences
between men and women and treating both sexes in a like manner. However, "the
strict equal treatment model does not question dominant norms as long as they do
not make overt distinctions between different groups. Where existing policies
35 Fredman (1992) Vol 21 No 2 ILJ (UK) 119 at 125.
36 Hunter (1992) at 3.
37 Meyerson (1993) Vol 9 part 2 SAJHR at 237.
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appear 'neutral', it simply defines equal treatment by reference to them". 38
As discussed in the previous section, policies that appear neutral are often
determined and influenced by dominant norms. It has been observed that:
The very idea of a norm implies that whatever is considered MnormalMcan take on a quality
of objective reality, so that it is no longer possible to see that the standard of measurement
reflects simply one group of qualities out of an infinite variety of human experience.
39
In employment the perpetuation of the dominant male norm invariably results in a
situation whereby in order to succeed females must conform to this norm.
However, this model of equality conceals" the substantive way in which man has
become the measure of all things". 40 The only manner in which women can
compete in this situation is "to try and discard their differences and behave more
like the members of the dominant group".41 Therefore women who wish to gain
some measure of recognition, success and security in employment must take on
the attributes of male employees.
For women this would entail pretending that the additional responsibities they face
in terms of childbearing and rearing and domestic duties outside the employment
situation are non-existent. This artificial process of moulding female workers into
male models creates added pressure and tension in the lives of female employees.
By ignoring these additional responsibities and treating women as if they were
male employees, inequality in employment and in society is entrenched rather than
dissolved. It has been said that:
38 Hunter (1992) at 5.
39 Ibid at 7 citing Lucinda M. Finley "Transcending Equality Theory: A way Out
of the Maternity and Wokplace Debate. "(1986) 86 Columbia Law Review
1118 at 1154.
40 Fredman (1992) Vol 21 No 2 ILJ (UK) 119 at 120.
41 Hunter (1992) at 5.
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...a persons gender, race, impairment, religion and so on includes a whole matrix of shared
social, cultural and inherited characteristics that can not simply be made to disappear .
Differences, and the detriments experienced by those who are different, may be obscured
or denied by an insistence that dominant norms are neutral , but in reality strict equal
treatment according to dominant norms has the effect of entrenching patterns of advantage
and dtsadvantace."
In her book, Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace, Rosemary Hunter provides
an example of this scenario:
... some companies efforts to get more women into management positions[is illustrated] by
encouraging women to have higher aspirations and greater levels of committment, to work
harder and be prepared toaccept more responsibility, attributes that have traditionally been
associated with male career progression.Concentration on these attributes ignores the need
to question promotion prerequisites, or to devise proposals for compensating career time
loss on maternity leave, or to institute child care arrangements, or to explore ways of
making management a more attractive position for worneri."
Thus, under this model women are rewarded for behaviour that conforms to the
dominant norm. However, the situation of women is in fact worsened by firstly the
pressure to mirror and adhere to the dominant norm whilst at the same time
fulfilling the role that women have always played in society. One writer has
labelled this as "equality with a vengeance". 44
The criticisms levied against the formal equality model and the needs that emerged
from the introduction of indirect discrimination legislat ion led to the formulation of
the substantive model of equality.
42 Ibid at 6.
43 Ibid at 5-6.
44 Ibid at 5 citing Lahey K.A. "Feminist Theories of (In) Equality"(1987) 3
Wisconsin Women's Law Journal 5 at 15.
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This model is based on the premise that in order for "legislation to succeed by
eliminating discrimination based on an employee's sex, male and females must
have an equal starting point. This means that there must be no barriers regarding,
for example, education, services or the labour market itself. Because such barriers
do exist( as discussed in the earlier section) differential treatment, which
accomodates differences between the sexes, is advocated. The idea is to create
substantial equality as opposed to formal equality."45
Therefore there must an accommodation of the differences between the dominant
norm and the manner in which women approach their jobs. Further, the social
hinderances that characterise women's lives must be taken into account. This
level of accommodation and tolerance of this deviance from the accepted norm in
employment must form the basis of any legislative action that is aimed at




There is a wealth of information available to South Africa on the law of indirect
discrimination. Antidiscrimination legislation in South Africa is not only a relatively
new feature in legislation but at this stage is also relatively sparse; However,
equipped with two separate statutes that outlaw indirect discrirninatlon'" and the
promise of the passing of a bill on Employment Equity by the end of 1997, it has
become increasingly necessary to look outwards for lessons in the formulation and
45 Louw C " What is Sexual Equality (with particular reference to equality in
the workplace)?" (1994) Vol 35 No 1 Codicil/us 19 at 24.
46
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996: section 8 (2);
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995: section 187(f) and Scedule 7 Item
(2).
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operation of indirect discrimination legislation.
The inception and development of the law on indirect discrimination in the United
States of America will be discussed fairly fully. There are two reasons for this.
I
i
Firstly, "disparate impact" discriminatlon or "adverse impact" discrimination (as
it is known in the US) was first formulated in America. Therefore it seems only
logical that any study on indirect discrimination begin in its birthplace. Secondly,
US disparate impact litigation has developed through almost three decades and the
various changes and developments has provided valuable lessons for the UK,
Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. It has been observed that:
The comparative perspective helps us see through the myths of our system, to uncover the
hidden premises on which we build, and to see more clearly the realities of our system and
its special characreristlcs."
Therefore South Africa should gain from these lessons.
The discussion of US law and case developments will include a discussion of the
definition and various elements of the concept of indirect discrimination. The
problems experienced in America in proving these elements will also be examined.
The law and case developments in the UK will only be discussed to the extent to
which the laws and case developments have deviated from US law. The
limitations of this work do not allow a discussion of indirect discrimination
developments in Europe, Australia and Canada. However, the case developments
in the US and Britain provide a substantial foundation for a comparative study of
indirect discrimination.
It should be noted that the vast majority of cases that were responsible for the
development of the disparate impact concept dealt with the issue of race. Initially,
47 Spiros Simitis "Denationalizing Labour Law: The Case of Age
Discrimination."(1994) Vol 15 No.3 Comparative Labor Law Journal at 321
quoting Clyde Summers in Blanpain R & Weiss M (edsl The Changing Face
of Labour Law and Industrial Relations (1 99~).
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the cases that did concern sex and gender issues were few and far between.
However, the principles that emerged from the racial disparate impact suits have
played a significant role in the development of the law of indirect discrimination
against women. Further, the uniform application of these principles to cases based
on various grounds of discrimination imply a consistency of law and judicial
method.
4.2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In the United States adverse impact discrimination developed largely as a result of
the initiatives of the courts. However, the initial role of the American legislature in
the formulation and introduction of the concept of adverse impact discrimination
can not be ignored.
The United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereafter referred to as the 1964 CRA)
is described as "the most important civil rights legislation of this century". 48
Certainly with regard to the law of adverse impact discrimination it provided the
necessary impetus for the formulation and development of this type of
discrimination.
Section 703(a), Title VII of the 1964 CRA states that it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
priviledges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, ~eg regate , or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, sex, or national origin.
48 Schlei S.L & Grossman P Employment Discrimination Law 2 ed (1983)
Foreword at vii (hereafter Schlei & Grossman).
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Although the 1964 CRA was a significant piece of legislation with regards to
discrimination, it failed to define the term "discrimination". It has been suggested
that interpretations immediately after the promulgation of the Act have indicated
that "when Title VII was passed, lIdiscrimination" was viewed by the legislature
as meaning simply disparate treatment.. .".49 Therefore the wording of the Act
left unanswered the question of whether policies which were facially neutral with
respect to the above-mentioned forbidden characteristics, but which had
discriminatory effects once applied, were permissable under the Act.
This question was consequently answered by means of the establishment by the
1964 CRA of an administrative body called the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the EEOC). In 1965 the EEOC in its
guidelines on sex discrimination, referred for the first time to indirect discrimination
or adverse impact discrimination. It "stated that 'discrimination' could be
established by proof of differential treatment of two similarly situated people, or
by proof of an adverse impact on a class of people" .50 Hence the formulation of
the concept lIadverse" or "disparate impact" discrimination.
The concept of disparate impact discrimination was addressed by the court for the
first time in 1971 5 1 but only received judicial acceptance by the US Supreme Court
49 Hunter (1992) at 16.
50 Ibid.
51 In the Phillips v Martin- Marietta Corp. (400 US 542 1971) case the female
applicant was informed by the company that it did not accept applications
from women with pre-school children. The company did, however, employ
men with children of that age group. Ida Phillips' suit failed in the lower
court and in the Court of Appeals. The Court reasoned as follows:
as per se violation of the Act can only be discrimination based solely on one of the
categories i.e in the case of sex, women vis a' vis men. When another criterion of
employment is added to one of the classifications listed in the Act, there is no tonaer
apparent discrimination based solely on race, color, religion, sex or national origin ... [The
law] does not prohibit discrimination or any classification except those named within the act
itself. Therefore once the employer has proved that he does not discriminate against the
protected groups, he is free thereafter to operate his business as he determines, hiring and
dismissing other groups for any reason he desires.....
Therefore the court refused to extend the wording of the Act to include the
concept of indirect discrimination.
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Court in Griggs v Duke Power Company. 52
4.2.1 Griggs v Duke Power Company
The facts of the case were as follows. The Duke Power Company was organised
into five different departments: labour, coal handling, operations, maintenance and
laboratory and testing. Until 2 July 1965, the date when Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 took effect, black employees were only employed in the labour
department. There was a huge disparity between the wages paid in this
department and the other departments. The highest paid jobs in labour paid less
than the lowest paid jobs in the other four departments.
The contentious policy was one which required a high school diploma for entrance
into any of the departments except labour. Although blacks were no longer
prevented from entering the other departments, the diploma requirement was
retained. As a further requirement, the company insisted on a minimum score on
two professionally prepared aptitude tests for employment in all departments
except labour. The required scores were the equivalent of the national median for
high school graduates. This was an even more restrictive standard than the high
school diploma requirement.
The percentage of black male employees who could meet these criteria was
significantly lower than that of white males. 53 The black employees claimed that
the employer was liable under Title VII, even in the absence of discriminatory
intent, because the practices although neutral on their face, had the effect of
excluding some employees because of race.
52 401 US 424 (1971).
53 The complainants showed that the intelligence tests had the effect of failing
demonstrably higher rate of Blacks than whites. Further the high school
diploma requirement had the same effect since only 12% of Black males as
compared to 34% of white males in that state had completed high school.
(see Hunter (1992) at 16).
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The Fourth Circuit Court ruled that there had been no disparate treatment ( the US
term for "direct" discrimination) and therefore refused to afford the employees any
relief. In the District Court's view, the purpose of the Act was not to redress the
inequalities that existed in the larger social system. It was merely to ensure that
all applicants for jobs were treated the same. 54
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court
examined the meaning of Title VII and concluded that the central enquiry was one
of discriminatory intent. Because there was no evidence of a discriminatory
purpose in the adoption of the requirements, there had been no violation of the
Act.
The reversal of the Court of Appeals judgement by the Supreme Court was most
accurately referred to by one writer as a "tour de force". 55 The Supreme Court
in overturning the lower court's decision, was in effect declaring that disparate
impact was as significant a key as disparate treatment to the dissolution of social
inequalities. Furthermore the absence of an intention to discriminate did not mean
that there had not been a violation of the Act.
The Court stated:
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissable classification. Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for
employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of
the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary Congress has now required
that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has - to resort to
the fable again - provided that the vessel in which the milk is proferred be one all seekers
can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation.
54 Epstein R Forbidden Grounds: The CaseagainstEmployment Discrimination
Laws (1992) at 195 commenting on this ruling stated that "Disparate
treatment, not disparate impact was the key .
55 Ibid.
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Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivatlon."
Therefore this landmark case refused to be bou nd by the restrictive wording of the
1964 CRA and took a liberal interpretative approach giving effect to the general
intention of the Act. The Supreme Court relying on the EEOC guidelines, reasoned
that "since the Act and its legislative history support the Commission's
construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will
of Congress. ,,57 It has been said that:
.. . superior federal courts in the US typically treat major statutes as blue prints of social
policy and will thus be concerned to find out the social reality of the -mischief- that a
particular Act is designed to remedy, and to interpret the Act so as to give full effect to its
58
purposes.
Therefore despite the lack of discriminatory intent (there was evidence the
Company was willing to finance two-thirds of the cost of the tuition fees for high
school training of the undereducated employees) the Court still ruled in favour of
the complainants, concentrating on the discriminatory effect of the policy rather
than the discriminatory intent. The Court stated that "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability. ,,59 Thus Griggs had in effect "shifted civil
rights policy to a group rights, equality-of-result rationale that made the social
consequences of employment practices, rather than their purposes, intent, or
56 401 U.S. 424 (1971) at 431-432.
57 Ibid at 434.
58 Hunter (1992) at 17 citing 0' Donovan K and Szyszczak E Equality and Sex
Discrimination Law (1988) at 27.
59 401 U.S. 424 (1971) at 432.
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motivation the decisive consideration in determining their lawfulness". 60
The Supreme Court then formulated a defense to adversely impact discriminatory
.practices or policies.
The touchstone is business necessltv."
In effect what the court meant by this was that the high school diploma
requirement and the use of intelligence tests must be shown to be related to the
performance of the jobs for which such entrance requirements are needed.
Congress "placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question". 62
Therefore Griggs went beyond the mere introduction of the concept of adverse
discrimination into the judicial arena. It contributed significantly to the law by
setting out the stages of enquiry in an adverse impact case. It appears from the
judgement that the initial enquiry in a disparate impact case is whether the policy
complained of has a disparate impact on a particular group. In satisfying this
enquiry the court advocated the use of statistics to prove the existence of the
disparate impact. Although the court's use of statistics was criticised by later
cases as being unsophisticated, the "validation of a statistical approach to
discrimination litigation,,63 was a significant development in the theory of adverse
impact discrimination. (The problems experienced in this statistical approach will
be discussed in a later section.)
60 Belz H Equality - A Quarter Century of Affirmative Action Transformed
(1991) at 51 .
61 401 US 424 (1971) at 431.
62 Ibid at 432.
63 Zimmer M.J, Sullivan C.A, Richards R.F & Calloway D.A Cases and
Materials on Employment Discrimination 3 ed (1994) at 360 (hereafter
Zimmer et al).
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However, once a complainant had, with the use of statistics, proved that the
employment requirement or condition complained of had an adverse impact, it is
said that a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. The burden
then shifts to the employer who must prove that such a policy is related to job
performance.
The popular description of the Griggs judgement as the "landmark" case on
adverse impact discrimination is not unfounded. The Supreme Court had taken a
significant step as it discarded past approaches of becoming bogged down in a
restrictive semantic debate. This significant approach did not only result in the
introduction of adverse impact discrimination into American courts, it also created
a liberal interpretative style that has managed to sustain itself and continues to
characterise judicial decisions on the topic.
Being the first case on adverse impact discrimination in the US, the manner in
which the Supreme Court approached this case was studied and followed,
criticised and refined, reversed and reverted back to, to a significant extent. The
concept of adverse impact discrimination as envisaged in Griggs was formulated
as a very simple idea. However, it left several questions regarding important issues
unanswered. These were later addressed by several Supreme Court decisions.
These decisions will now be discussed to the extent in which they have altered
or expanded on the paradigm case of Griggs.
4.3 PROVING ADVERSE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION
This section will address the various problems encountered by the American courts
in proving adverse impact discrimination.
4.3.1 Proving the impact element
The Griggs Court has been criticised as being "permissive" in proving the
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plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact." In proving the adverse impact
requirement the Griggs Court examined the high school graduation rates for the
entire state of North Carolina. This method of establishing the adverse impact of
a requirement or policy has received great criticism.
Zimmer et ai, commenting on the approach used in Griggs, argues that, "it is at
least theoretically possible that the two requirements had no actual adverse impact
at the Dan River plant because African-American applicants in that area were
better educated and tested higher (or because white applicants in that area were
less educated and tested lower),,65 than the general population of the entire
state of North carolina. Therefore the impact measured in Griggs may merely be
theoretical as opposed to the actual adverse impact on the employees affected by
the employment practices.
The issue of establishing the adverse impact of an employment requirement or
condition was addressed in the following Supreme Court decisions.
In Dothard v Rawlinson,66 the first American adverse impact case based on sex,
the Supreme Court examined the adverse impact ofa statutory height and weight
requirement on female applicants for the position of correctional counsellor trainee.
In considering the effect of the minimum height and weight standards on this
disparity in rate of hiring between the sexes, the District Court followed the Griggs
approach and compared the number of women and men in the United States,
64 Ibid at 365.
65 Ibid.
66 433 US 321 (1977).
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between the ages of 18 and 79, who could comply with these requirements.
67
Accordingly, the District Court found that Rawlinson (the complainant) had made
out a prima facie case of unlawful sex discrimination.
The appellants, however, argued "that a showinq of disproportionate impact on
women based on generalized national statistics should not suffice to establish a
prima facie case". 68 They pointed out the failure of Rawlinson to adduce
comparative statistics concerning actual applicants for the position at issue.
The Supreme Court responded to this argument by stating that "there is no
requirement, however, that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must
always be based on analysis of characterisitics of actual applicants". 69 [own
emphasis added]
The Rawlinson Court reasoned:
The application process itself might not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant
pool , since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying because of a self-
recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as being discriminatory. A
potential applicant could easily determine her weight and height and conclude that to make
an application would be futile. Moreover, reliance on general population demographic data
was not misplaced where there was no reason to suppose that physical height and weight
characteristics of Alabama men and women differ markedly from those of the national
67 The 5'2" requirement would operate to exclude 33.29% of women in the
United States between the ages of 18 and 79, while excluding only 1.28%
of men between the same ages. The 120 pound weight restriction would
exclude 22.29% of the women and 2.35% of the men in this age group.
When the height and weight restrictions are combined, Alabama's statutory
standards would exclude 41.13% of the female population while excluding
less than 1 % of the male population.




The Court, therefore confirmed the Griggs judgment where disparate impact was
proved by using national statistics as well.
This approach of using national statistics as opposed to examining the adverse
impact of a requirement on the actual applicant pool was followed by the Supreme
Court until the decision of New York City Transit Authority v Beazer7 1
In Beazerthe plaintiffs were challenging the employer's rule of disqualifying people
who used methadone." Plaintiffs showed that 81 percent of all Transit Authority
(TA) employees suspected of drug use were Black or Hispanic and approximately
between 62 and 65 percent of all methadone-maintained people in New York City
were Black or Hispanic." The plaintiffs claimed that this disqualifying rule had a
disparate impact on employees and applicants of Black or Hispanic origin.
The Supreme Court ruled that a prima facie case of disparate impact had not been
successfully established.
The Court stated that:
... [ the statistics about overall drug use tell] us nothing about the racial composition of the
employees suspected of using methadone. Nor does the record give us any information
about the number of black, Hispanic, or white persons who are dismissed for using
methadone.. .We do not know...how many of these persons [in metadone maintenance
70 Ibid.
71 440 US 568 (1979).
72
This was a drug used as a substitute for heroin in the treatment of heroin
addiction.
73 440 US 568 (1979) at 579.
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programs] ever worked or sought to work for TA. This statistic reveals little if anything
about the racial composition of the class of TA job applicants and employees receiving
methadone treatment.•74
According to Zimmer et ai, the Court in this particular case was making a
significant departure from Griggs and Dothard by suggesting that "the relevant
group for deriving impact statistics is the Transit Authority's applicant pOOI,,75
and not the population of methadone users in New York.
This new development in proving a prima facie case of disparate impact was
clearly evident in the cases that followed Beazer. Undoubtedly the most significant
(and contentious) authority in this respect was Wards Cove P;fcking Co. v
Atonio."
This case involved disparate impact claims, involving the employment practices of
two companies that operated salmon canneries in the remote areas of Alaska. Jobs
at the canneries were divided into two general types: "cannery jobs", which were
unskilled positions filled mostly by nonwhites, and "noncannery jobs", which were
skilled positions that were filled with predominantly white workers. The
noncannery jobs paid more than the cannery positions.
In 1974 a class of nonwhite cannery workers brought a Title VII action against the
companies' hiring and promotion practices. These practices included nepotism, a
rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels and
a practice of promoting from within. 77 The employees claimed that these
employment practices were responsible for the racial division of the workforce.
74 Ibid at 585.
75 Zimmer et al (1994) at 371 .
76 490 US 642 (1989).
77 Ibid at 647.
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The Court of Appeals found that the claimants had established a prima facie case
of disparate impact discrimination by providing statistics which indicated that there
was a high percentage of nonwhite workers in cannery jobs and a low percentage
of such workers occupying the skilled noncannery positions.
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court attacked the
lower court's method of proving a prima facie case of disparate impact. The
Supreme Court stated that "the Court of Appeals' ruling here misapprehends our
precedents and the purposes of Title VII". 78
The ... comparison ... fundamentally misconceived the role of statistics in employment
discrimination cases. The "proper comparison [is) between the racial composition of {the
at-issue jobs) and the racial composition of the qualified .. . population in the relevant labor
market" . It is such a comparison - between the racial composition of the qualified persons
in the labour market and the persons holding at-issue jobs - that generally forms the basis
for the initial enquiry in a disparate-impact case. Alternatively, in cases where such labor
market statistics will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain, we have recognized that
certain other statistics - such as measures indicating the racial composition of "otherwise-
qualified applicants" for at-issue jobs - are equally probative for this purpose."
In this case the skilled noncannery positions were the jobs-at-issue. The Supreme
Court reasoned that the proper comparison would have been to compare the racial
composition of the at-issue-jobs and the racial composition of the section of the
labour market that was qualified to hold at-issue-jobs. The Court of Appeals had
therefore erred in making a comparison between the racial composition of cannery
and noncannery jobs because"... the cannery workforce in no way reflected 'the
pool of qualified job applicants" or the qualified population in the labor force'. 80
78 Ibid at 650.
79 Ibid at 650-651. [The statement within quotation marks has been extracted
from Hazelwood School District v United States 433 U.S. 299 at
308(1977).]
80 Ibid at 651.
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The Supreme Court stated:
Racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's workforce does not, without more,
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect to the selection of workers for
the employer's other positions....As long as there are no barriers or practices deterring
nonwhites from applying for cannery positions, if the the percentage of selected applicants
who are nonwhite is not significantly less than the percentage of Qualified applicants who
are nonwhite, the employer's selection mechanism probably does not operate with a
disparate impact on rninorttles."
Therefore the Wards Cove decision, following the initiative of the Supreme Court
in Beazer, represented a significant departure from earlier cases where
comparisons were based on national statistics (see Griggs and Rawlinson). Perhaps
the most significant approval of this section of the Wards Cove decision, that is
relating specifically to proving the disparate impact element, came in the form of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, (hereafter the 1991 CRA).
Congress had criticised the Wards Cove decision as having "weakened the scope
and effectiveness of Federal Civil Rights protections... ,,82, and overturned a
substantial part of the Wards Cove judgement. However, the Court's ruling with
regard to proving the adverse impact of an employment policy was not overturned
and continues to be followed by US courts."
The imperative question at this stage is whether this is good law? For the most
part, yes.The narrowing down of the comparison pools provided realistic figures
of the workers who were adversely impacted. However, it posed new difficulites.
The statistics gained from a national pool would, in all probability, be more
81 Ibid at 653.
82
The United States Civil Rights Act of 1991: section 2 (2).
83
In Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 58 FEP 1346 (N.D. Cal 1992) the Wards
~ove judgement with regard to establishing a prima facie case of disparate
Impact was followed.
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accessible because studies on a national level are conducted on a regular basis and
figures can easily be obtained from them. However, in order to obtain statistics
that compared the pool of qualified applicants to the pool of workers who occupied
at-issue jobs, a complainant would have to embark on a specialised study which
would firstly, be costly and time consuming and secondly, the information required
is usually within the exclusive knowledge of the employer. This had the
unfortunate affect of discouraging disparate impact claims.
4.3.2 The required degree of disparity
A further problem that arose out of the first element in proving a disparate impact
case was the question of what "degree of difference [was] sufficient to warrant
legal interference". 84
The cases remain unclear in this respect. In Griggs the Court seemed to imply that
the impact must be "substantial". In Albermarle v Moody the Court used the word
"significantly different" to describe the degree of impact required. In Washington
v Davis the court used the words "substantially disproportionate" to describe the
disparate impact. However, according to Shlei and Grossman these decisions
afforded little or no guidance on "just what threshold mathematical showing of
variance ... suffices as a 'substantial disproportionate impact'". 85 Although the
language of these judgments seems to suggest that the impact had to be of a
sizeable nature, the exact quantum of disparity required was left unanswered. This
resulted in a situation whereby "the courts .. . operated on an unfortunate ad hoc
basis in determining the existence of substantial adverse impact". 86
84 Player M.A., Shoben E.W. and Lieberwitz R.L. Employment Discrimination
Law: Cases and Materials (1 990) at 424.
85 Shlei and Grossman (1983) at 98 citing Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 593 F.2d 607,608,19 FEP 663,664 (5th Cir. 1979) Footnote 72.
86 Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 19 FEP 232, 234(E.D. Tex. 1978).
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The Courts did, however, receive some guidance when the issue of substantial
adverse impact was addressed by the EEOC in its Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures. The Commission took the following position.
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic woup which is less than four -fifths (4/5) or
(eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rating will generally be regarded
by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
fiths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact."
This eighty percent test, however, posed several statistical problems. The test has
been criticised as being limited in its application." It has been suggested that the
test is best suited in situations where large groups of workers are involved. One
study indicated that where the group of workers involved were as little as five, the
application of the eighty percent rule would result in a 50 percent chance of a false
charge of discrlrninatiori." Further, the test is said to work "best" if there are
only two comparison groups of workers. Therefore where there exists several
racial or ethnic groups the possibilty of failure increases."
The limitations of this work do not allow a lengthy discussion of the statistical
problems involved. However, the problems experienced indicate that the
introduction of statistics had opened a Pandora's box. This had the effect of
complicating adverse impact suits.
87 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978) 29 CFR s
1607. 4D (1989).
88 Zimmer etet (1994) at 208-211.
89 Ibid at 208, citing the calculations conducted by Boardman A.E. "Another
Analysis of the EEOC 'Four-Fifths' Rule" 25 Mgmt. Sci 770 at 773 (1979).
This study also indicated that if the group was as large as 50 the chance of
a false charge of discrimination would over 20 percent.
90 Ibid at 209.
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The great diversity of cases that followed the Griggs judgement resulted in the
expansion of the concept of adverse impact discrimination. However, this diversity
brought with it several questions that had not been within the contemplation of the
Supreme Court in Griggs. This section will address these questions.
4.3.3 i fleBOffiim-i.in-e ~[gument!
, .
One of the issues that developed out of the first element of establishing disparate
impact was what has been referred to as the "bottom-line" argument. In terms of
this argument "an employer's acts of racial discrimination in promotions - affected
by an examination having disparate impact - would not render the employer liable
for the racial discrimination suffered by employees barred from promotion if the
"bottom line" result of the promotional process was an appropriate racial
balance. ,,91
This theory was first formulated by the Supreme Court in Connecticut v Teal 92
where the Court addressed the question of whether it was possible for an
employer to refute a claim of disparate impact based on the employer's "bottom-
line"statistics.
The respondents were black employees of the Department of Income and
Maintenance of the State of Connecticut. Each had received a provisional
promotion to the position of Welfare Eligibility Supervisor and had remained in that
capacity for approximately two years. In order to obtain permanent status as
supervisors, the respondents had to participate in a selection process that insisted,
amongst other requirements, on the passing of a written examination. The
respondents failed the exam and consequently instituted a Title VII action against
their employer. They alleged that the test excluded a disproportionate number of
91 457 US 440 (1982) at 440.
92 Ibid.
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blacks and was not job related. 93
However, the employers defended its actions in the following manner. They stated
that promotions were made from an eligibility list that was drawn up from all those
who had passed the written exam. The factors that were considered when
awarding a promotion to a person on the eligibility list were "past work
performance, recommendations of the candidates' supervisors and, to a lesser
extent, seniority". 94 Ho:;ver, the employers also applied an affirmative action
policy when choosing persons from the eligibility list for promotion. They claimed
that the aim of this policy was to ensure that a significant number of black
employees were promoted to the capacity of supervisors. As a result of the
application of this affirmative action policy a greater percentage of blacks who
were on the eligibility list were promoted as compared to the white employees who
were eligible for promotion." Therefore, the employers argued that there was no
disparate impact as the "bottom-line" result were "more favourable to blacks than
whites".96
The District Court ruled in favour of the employers, holding that "bottom-line"
percentages provided by the employers "precluded the finding of a Title VII
violation." The Court in effect was ruling that "the results of the written
examination alone was insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate
impact in violation of Title VII". 97
93 54.17% of the blacks who wrote passed as compared to 79.54% of the
whites who wrote that passed.
94 457 US 440 (1982) at 444.
95 Of the 48 identified black candidates who participated in the selection
process, 22.9 percent were promoted (as compared to 13.5% of the white
population) .
96 457 US 440 (1982) at 444.
97 Ibid at 445.
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The United States Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the lower
court and stated that the "bottom line" results does not prevent employees from
establishing a prima facie case. Neither does it provide an employer with a defense
to such a case.
The Supreme Court referred to the Griggs judgement where the court had relied
on s703(a)(2) of the 1964 CRA. The Court stated that the focus of this section
was on employment practices, policies and tests that denied equal employment
opportunities.
Thus in this particular case the written examination represented a bar or "barrier"
to equal employment opportunities. The fact that the final number of blacks l:
promoted was greater than the number of whites promoted was considered 1f
irrelevant by the court. The Supreme Court stated:
The suggestion that disparate impact should be measured only at the bottom line ignores
the fact that Title VII guarantees those individual respondents the opportunity to compete
equally with white workers on the basis of job-related crlteria."
The case also clarified the group versus individual debate surrounding disparate
impact cases. The Supreme Court made specific reference to s 703(a)(2) of the
1964 CRA which prohibited employment practices "that would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities". The Court stated
unambiguously that "the principal focus of the statute is the protection of the
individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole.
Indeed, the entire statute and its legislative history are replete with reference to
protection for the individual". 99
98 Ibid at 451.
99 Ibid at 453-454.
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It is clear that Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against
some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other
100
members of the employees group...
Therefore according to the Teal judgment, "bottom-line" statistics could never be
a defence to disparate impact cases as a racially balanced workforce will not
prevent an employer from being liable for acts of discrimination that tend to have
an adverse impact on certain individuals of a group.
This Supreme Court decision was followed in the Wards Cove Packing v Antonio
judgment. The Court confirmed the Teal judgment by stating that "an employer
cannot escape liability under Title VII by demonstrating that, 'at the bottom line',
his work force is racially balanced.. ,,101
However, the Wards Cove judgment went a step further by stating that this
bottom-line argument does not apply exclusively to employers. The Court reasoned
that complainants would also be prevented from using bottom-line statistics in
proving disparate impact. This leads to a discussion of what has been referred to
as the particularity rule.
4.3.4 The Particularity Rule
In 1989 the Supreme Court addressed the situation where employment selection
is made on the basis of a variety of factors. The imperative question was whether
100
101
Ibid at 455. The Court stated further that "In Phillips v Martin
Marietta Corp., we recognized that a rule barring employment of all
married women with preschool children, if not a bona fide
occupational qualification under s 703(e), violated Title VII, even
though female applicants without prescool children were hired in
sufficient numbers that they constituted 75 to 80 percent of the
persons employed in the position that the plaintiff sought".
490 US 642 (1989) at 656.
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a plaintiff could prove disparate impact by establishing that the selection process
in general had created a racial imbalance in the workforce or was it necessary for
a plaintiff to identify the particular practice that caused the racial disparity.
The Supreme Court took the view that disparate impact could not be established
by "showing that 'at the bottom-line' there is racial imbalance in the
workforce" .102 In order to impart liability to an employer a complainant had to
identify the particular policy or hiring requirement that was responsible for the
disparate impact. The Supreme Court stated that "as a general matter, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment ).1-
practice that has created the disparate impact under attack. Such a showing is an
integral part of the plaintiff's prima facie case in a disparate impact suit under Title
VII".103
In applying this ruling to the facts of Wards Cove the Court stated that in attacking
the various objective and subjective practices of the employer the "respondents
will also have to demonstrate that the disparity that they complain of is the result
of the one or more employment practices that they are attacking here, specifically
showing that each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on
employment opportunites for whites and nonwhites". 104
This section of the Wards Cove judgment was modified to some extent by the




(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(il, the complaining party shall
demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate





elements of the respondent's decision making process are not capable of seperation
for analysis, the decision making process may be analysed as one employment
practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause
the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity.
Therefore although the 1991 CRA confirmed the particularity rule it recognised the
difficulties that such a rule posed to complainants and provided a measure of
protection for complainants who could not separate a particular employment
practice from the general decision-making process.
Although this exception to the particularity rule can be commended, it should be
noted that the burden placed on complainants to, firstly, identify particular
practices and, secondly, provide statistics that indicate the disparate impact of
such practices is unduly heavy. These decisions seem to be moving in a direction
whereby it is becoming increasingly difficult for complainants to prove a prima
facie case of discrimination. This is made more problematic by the fact that a
substantial proportion of the information required to prove a prima facie case of
disparate impact is within the exclusive knowledge of the employer and thus
inaccessible to the worker/so
4.3.5 The employer's defence of Business Necessity
As discussed earlier, the landmark case of Griggs formulated the defence to a
disparate impact claim. In stating that "Itlhe touchstone is business
necessity,,105 the Court did not envisage the problems and confusion that would
follow in the trail of its judgment. The root of the confusion was the statement
that immediately followed the introduction of "business necessity" as a defence.
In explaining business necessity the Griggs Court stated that "Iilf an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
105
401 US 424 (1971) at 431.
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performance, the practice is prohibited". 106 Thus the concept of "job
relatedness" was also introduced.
This "interchangeability of terms"?' resulted in great confusion and a semantic
debate that had a profound effect on the judicial decisions that followed Griggs.
The central issue surrounding this debate was whether the use of both these terms
meant that they were to be "viewed as requiring only that an employer prove that
his employment practices are legitimately related to job performance"!" or
whether by using the word "necessity," it was requiring some showing of
essentiality to the operation of the business?,,'09
Initially, "business necessity" was construed as meaning "job relatedness" . Shlei
and Grossman suggest that the reason for this interpretation could lie in the fact
that other language used in Griggs, for instance "a reasonable measure of job
performance"!" and the Court's reference to the EEOC Guidelines which
provide that selection tests must be "signi ficantly correlated with important
elements .of work behaviour which comprise or are relevant to the job"'" led
to this conclusion. However, it may also sucessfully be argued that there was
reference to vocabulary that would lead one to conclude that the Court in referring
to "business necessity" construed this as meaning the operational requirements








Shlei and Grossman (1983) at 113.
Contreras v City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 at 1278-79, 25 FEP
at 873 (9th Cir, 1981).
Shlei and Grossman (1983) at 113.
401 US 424 (1971) at 436.
EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR s 1607
35 FED REG. 12333 (1970) quoted in Griggs 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
at 433 [footnote 91.
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need". 112
This situation was addressed by the Supreme Court decision of Albermarle Paper
Co. v Moody. 113 In this case the Court in addressing the issue of "job
relatedness" referred to "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question"!" and ignored the concept of business necessity.
~bermarle had required applicants for employment in the skilled lines of
progression to have a high school diploma and to pass two tests. 115 The central
issue in this case was whether the results of the validation study, undertaken by
the Company to study the "job relatedness" of its testing programme, constituted
a valid defence to the claim of disparate impact. The study compared the test
scores of current employees with the assessment of their competence by their
relevant supervisors. This was done in ten job groupings selected from the middle
to top spectrum of the workforce. The study revealed that there existed a
"significant statistical correlation" between the ratings of the supervisors and the






401 US 424 (1971) at 432.
422 US 405 (1975).
Ibid at 425.
The Revised Beta Examination, allegedly a measure of nonverbal
intelligence and the Wonderlic Personnel Test (available in alternative
Forms A and B), allegedly a measure of verbal facility.
The significant correlation with supervisorial ratings in three job
groupings for the Beta test, in seven job groupings for either Form A
or F~rm B of the Wonderlic Test, and in two job groupings for the
required battery of both the Beta and the Wonderlic Tests.
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The District Court ruled that it had been proved that the tests were job related. The
Court of Appeals stated that the Lower Court had erred in its decision.
The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the employer had shown
its tests to be job related and referred to the Griggs judgment:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously they are
useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling
force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. What- --- --
Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and
h . b 117not t e person In a stract.
Further, the Court made reference to the "Guidelines" issued by the EEOC for
employers seeking to determine, through professional validation studies, whether
their employment tests are job related.
The message of these Guidelines is the same as that of the Griggs case - that discriminatory
tests areimpermissable unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be •
predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.Iown
emphasis added] . 118
In applying these Guidelines the Supreme Court ruled that the employer's
validation study had failed to satisfy the job relatedness requirement. There were
several reasons for this conclusion. Firstly, .there was no significant correlation
between the test scores and the supervisors' ratings. The Court stated that "the




401 US 424 (1971) at 436.
29 CFR s 1607.4(c).
The Beta Exam showed a correlation in only three of eight lines of job
progression. In terms of the Wonderlic tests Form A and Form B, only
one of the forms showed significant correlation and this was in
respect of only four job grades. In two of the studied job grades no
significant correlation could be shown.
40
testing programme under the Guidelines. Secondly, the validation study compared
test scores to the subjective ratings of supervisors. The Court stated that the
standard against which the supervisors were required to rank employees ·was
extremely vague and fatally open to divergent interpretations". 120
The Court stated:
There was no way of knowing precisely what critieria of job performance the supervisors
were considering, whether each of the supervisors was considering the same criteria or
whether, indeed, any of the supervisors actually applied a focused and stable body of
criteria of any kind. 121
Thirdly, the company focused its study on job groupings that were situated at the
top end of the line of job progressions. The Court regarded this as fatal to the
legitimacy of the validation study. The Supreme Court stated:
The fact that the best of those employees working near a top of a line of progression score
well on a test does not necessarily mean that the test or some particular cutoff score on the
test, is a permissible measure of the minimal qualifications of new workers entering lower
level jobS.122
Thus the Court suggested that this method of testing should rather be utilised as
a "promotion device, rather than as a screen for entry into low-level jobs".123
Finally, the validation study's selected pool of study comprised -of experienced






422 US 405 (1975) at 433. The court also stated that "supervisors
were asked in each of the groupings to determine which ones
[employees] they felt irrespective of the job they were actually doing,
but in their respective jobs, did a better job than the person they





applicants who were ·younger, largely inexperienced, and in many instances
nonwhite".124 Therefore since the test was applied at the threshold of
employment, the fact that a correlation was shown between the test results and
supervisor ratings at the top of the employment spectrum, does not in itself prove
that these tests were related to the jobs of applicants in the lower skills line
progression at the Company.
The Albermarle judgment succinctly indicated that the Supreme Court would
approach the employer's defence of job relatedness with caution. It also indicated
that employers would not be able to absolve themselves from liability in disparate
impact suits merely by contracting a professional to conduct a valldationstudv,
The approach of the Court here suggested that validation study results would not
be readily accepted. Instead these results and the manner in which the study was
conducted would be scrutinised.
It was also a significant judgment in that the appropriate standard of proof of job
_~ :::::==-=- oz:: ..
relatedness had been characterised by vagueness in past judgments. Although
Albermarle did not take a direct approach of defining "job relatedness", its
reference and reliance on the EEOC guidelines, as well as its' discussion of the
reasons for refuting the defence in this instance, provided the Supreme Court with
a significant precedent with respect to the job relatedness defence.
However, this was to chan9_~~~n',!aticaIlY in the following year w ith the Supreme
Court Judgment of Washington v Davis which also examined the issue of
job relatedness.
The District of Columbia police department required for admission to its police
academy a high school diploma and a 50 percent pass on a "Test 21" developed




426 US 229 (1976).
42
. d hensi ,,126vocabulary, readmg an compre ension.
The District Court ruled that the test had an adverse impact on black applicants.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court's decision, finding that
the test was valid.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the "job relatedness" of the test. The
Court concluded that minimum verbal and communicative skill would be "very
useful, if not essential, to satifactory progress in the training regimen".127
Agreeing with the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court stated:
Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of the police training program and that a
positive relationship between the test and the training course performance was sufficient
to validate the former, wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual performance as
a police officer. 128
Therefore the court in declining to follow the EEOC guidelines, applied a
"usefulness" test. The implication of this approach was significant. The vocabulary
used in the EEOC guidelines and followed in Albermarle was "significant
correlation". The Griggs judgment referred to the "manifest relationship"of the
~ -- ---- -
requirement to the job. Therefore the EEOC guidelines and the Supreme Court
", -_..- _._ -----."
decisions prior to Davis envisaged the defence of~t:r"relatednessJs a strict
standard whereby a requirement could not be validated unless it was essential for
the performance of the job in question. The Davis judgment made a significant









Business -necessity- was apparently a matter of whether the criterion in issue had a
reasonable relationship to the job in issue.·129
This issue was also addressed in the Wards Cove decision where the court stated:
the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer. The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned
review of the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice. A mere
insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because such a low standard of
review would permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly
neutral employment practices. At the same time ,though, there is no requirement that the
challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to
pass the muster. 130
According to Shlei and Grossman131, this reference to "legitimate employment
goals" as well the statement by the Court in Dothard v Rawlinson in a footnote
that selection devices must be "necessary to safe and efficient job
performance". 132 indicates "business necessity" had moved away from the
Albermarle approach of a legitimate relevance to job performance. The nature of
the defence was now characterised by the operational requirements of the
business.
The Wards judgment was "seen by many as an evisceration of the entire disparate
impact theory".133 The case "radically redefined the defence of business
necessity by taking out "necessity" and replacing it with the notion of reasonable k"'







Cox P.N Employment Discrimination (1987) at 7-36 - 7-37.
490 US 642 (1989) at 659.
Shlei and Grossman (1983) at 113.
433 US 321 (1977) at 332, footnote 14.
Zimmer et al (1994) at 361.
Ibid at 426.
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The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification for his
use of the challenged practice... [Tlhere is no requirement that the challenged practice be
'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass the muster. 135
This judgment received severe critcism. In fact lithe major thrust of the Civil rights
Act of 1991 was to overturn these aspects of ' Wards Cove... " 136 Congress
rejected the ruling by the Wards Cove Court that a practice need not be essential
or indispensable. The 1991 CRA returned to the Griggs formulated concepts of
"business necessity" and "job relatedness" .'37 However, instead of clarifying the
issue, this return to "concepts .... enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs ...
and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing .. .",38 led to
a return of a barrage of critical comments regarding the interchangeable use of
these concepts.
Thus the CRA of 1991 proved to be a legislative disappointment with regard to the
defence of business necessity. Having identified the problem that Wards Cove had
introduced by lowering the standard of proof to reasonableness, a great deal of
faith was placed in this piece of legislation to clarify the defence of "job
relatedness". Regrettably, however this faith was misplaced. It is hoped that the





490 US 642 (1989) at 659.
Zimmer et al (1994) at 426.
See s 703(kH 1HA) where it is provided that 11 an unlawful employment
practice based on disparate impact" occurs when (j) a complaining
party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basi of race, color,
religion,sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity".
Zimmer et al (1994) at 427.
4.3.6 Burden of proof
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The paradigm judgment of Griggs approached the issue of the onus of proof in a
disparate impact case in the same simplistic manner in which it approached other
issues in the case.
The Supreme Court in the Albermarle decision succinctly summarised the position
taken by the Griggs court with regards to the onus of proof.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. this Court unanimously held that Title VII forbids the use of
employment tests that are discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets - the burden
of showing that any given requirement lhasl ...a manifest relationship to the employment in
question ." This burden arises ofcourse, only after the complaining party or class has made
out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e.,has 'shown that the tests in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the
I f I· 139poo 0 app icants.
Therefore the complainant bears the inital burden of proof. He/she has to prove
a prima face case of discrimination by establishing that the requirement or
condition in question has a disparate impact on the particular group of persons to
which the applicant belongs. Once the complainant has been successful in
discharging this burden, the onus shifts to the employer to defend the employment
practice as having a Mmanifest relationship to the .employment in question".
However, the Albermarle court took this two-stage process a step further in the
following manner.
If the employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are -job related," it
remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate
interest in effecient and trustworthy workmanship .· Such a showing would be evidence
139
422 US 405 (1975) at 425.
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f dl "" " .140that the employer was using its tests merely as a ·pretexr or rscnrrunauon.
Thus the Court introduced the concept of "alternative practices". The complainant
would in this instance bear the burden of proving that these alternative practices
could accomplish the same goals that the employer stated was necessary for the
efficient running of his business, without the disparate impact on the complainant.
Although, perhaps it was intended as a means of providing the complainant with
another opportunity to substantiate his case, it did place a significant burden on
a complainant who would have to provide evidence which was not always easily
ascertainable. Further the provision of alternative practices operates on the
premise that a worker is knowledgable with respect to employment practices. This
is usually an employer's field of expertise. Thus once again the complainant met
with difficulties.
The 1991 CRA did little to reduce the impact of these difficulties. The Act returned
to pre- Wards Cove decisions. This effectively meant that since the introduction of
alternative practices emerged prior to Wards, this feature of disparate impact
discrimination remained.
Expanding on the onus of proof issue, the Court in Dothard stated that the burden
of justifying the employment practice was a burden of production and not a burden
of persuasion. The Court stated that the burden of persuasion remained with the
plaintiff. What the Dothard Court meant by this was the employer merely had to
provide a business justificated reason. The employer did not bear the burden of
persuading the Court that this was a justifiable reason. This onus was borne by the
plaintiff.





...To the extent that [other) cases speak of an employer' -burden of proof- with respect
to a legitimate business justification defense, see, e.g. Dothard v. Rawlinson, they should
have been understood to mean an employer's production - but not persuasion - burden.
The persuasion here must remain with the plaintiff, for it is he who must prove that it was
-because of such individual's race, color," etc., that he was denied a desired employment
. 141opporturutv.
Relying on the Albermarle and Watson judgments, the Court stated that despite the
fact that an employer may be successful in establishing a business necessity
defence, the complainants may still have a chance of succeeding with their case.
This can be achieved by providing alternative tests or selection devices which
"would also serve the employer's legitimate [hiring] lnterestlsl, [but] without a
similarly undesirable racial effect". 142
The Court stated that if the complainants afforded alternatives to petitioners'
hiring practices that reduce the racially-disparate impact of practices currently
being used and the employer refused to adopt these alternative practices, this
would lead to an inference that employer's reason for adopting the practice at
issue was a discriminatory one.
However, the Wards Cove Court softened the blow of this judgment on employers
by cautioning the Court about adopting such alternatives.
"Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices,"
Fumco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950, 57
L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); consequently the judiciary should proceed with care before mandating








The Court was effectively saying that business should be left to the business world
and the limited expertise of the courts in this arena should encourage cautious
decisions in the adoption of proposed alternative practices.
Further the Court stated that lI[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of
proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they
would be equally effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's
legitimate business goals". 144
The above statement leaves little doubt as to why this judgment has been the
focus of much active debate and criticism. The Court was encouraging the
prioritisation of cost and efficiency factors over the effects of adverse impact
discrimination.
It is no doubt understandable why the Wards Cove decision did not enjoy a very
long judicial history. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled this judgement to a
significant extent. According to Zimmer et al"[t]he overiding purpose of the new
statute is to provide statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII. 11145
The 1991 CRA addressed the issue of onus of proof and provided the following
ammendments. Once the complainant had established the disparate impact, the
burden of proof shifted to the employer who had to "demonstrate" that lithe
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessltv.t':" This burden was now extended to include the burden of






Zimmer et al (1994) at 361 -362.
United States Civil Rights Act of 1991: section 3(3).
The statute defines demonstrate as "meets the burden of production
and persuasion" (see s 701 (m) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
4 .3.7 Conclusion
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Thus it clearly evident that although disparate impact originally developed as a
relatively simple idea, it has evolved into a high ly sophisticated concept. Although
Griggs was criticised by later decisions, as being an over-simplistic judgment that
ignored several important issues, there is a lot to be said for simplicity. This is
especially so since the sophistication that has characterised later judgments has
brought with it a difficulty and uncertainty that has had a significant effect on
disparate impact suits.
4.4 BRITAIN
The concept of indirect discrimination first appeared in Britain in 1975 by means
of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. This was largely due to the influence of the
United States. 148 However, beyond the adoption of the central principles
regarding indirect discrimination as formulated by Griggs, British case law on
indirect discrimination developed very much as a result of the practice of the
British judiciary to give effect to the specific provisions as laid down in the
legislation. This was in distinct contrast to the American approach of giving effect
to the general intention of the legislation.
According to the British Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 (hereafter referred to as
the SDA):
A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of
any provision of this Act if-......
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies equally to a man but-
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is considerably
smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to
148
When the Sex Discrimination Bill was introduced in 1974, it provided
for direct discrimination only. It was only after the British Home
Secretary's visit to the US that indirect discrimination was included
in this bill. (see Hunter (1992) at 21).
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whom it is applied , and
(iii) I
. h i 149which is to her detriment because she cannot comp Y WIt It.
From the above legislation, several important features regarding the law on indirect
discrimination comes to the fore.
Firstly, unlike the United States, the concept of indirect discrimination developed
in Britain as a result of its legislative introduction and not through the initiatives of
the British courts. In fact it can been argued that the British courts were better
equipped at the out set, to deal with indirect discrimination cases because of the
existence of a statute that explicitly set out the manner in which indirect
discrimination cases were to be proved.
Secondly, although the general principles of Griggs were influential in the drawing
of this legislation, this "definition of indirect discrimination is not a direct
transcription from the formulation of adverse impact dicrimination in Griggs. "'50
There were two significant departures from US law. The first was the widening of
the defense of "business necessity" or "job relatedness". Under British law this
defense is "justifiablity irrespective of sex". Thus according to Hunter, "something
not strictly necessary could be justifiable". 151 The second departure was the
addition of the requirement that the complainant must have suffered a
detrirnent.l'" The implications of these departures from American law will be





A similar section appeared in the UK Race Relations Act of 1976 as
well.
Hunter (1992) at 22.
Ibid at 26 citing McCrudden C "Institutional Discrimination" (1982)
2 Oxford Journal Of Legal Studies 303 at 375-8.
According to Hunter, the reasoning behind this requirement was to
ensure that the legislation was invoked by "genuine victims" and not
merely "concerned citizens" (1992) at 22.
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This section will briefly examine the various elements as set out in the SDA and
the problems experienced with regards to these elements.
4.4.1 The application of a requirement or condition
Initially, the British courts' interpretation of this element was liberal. This liberal
approach was indicated by the acceptance by British courts of a wide variety of
requirements and conditions. Some examples which indicate this liberal approach
are the following:
1. A redundancy agreement with the trade union that provided for part-
time workers to be retrenched first. 153
2. A requirement that all employees work on a full time basis .l'"
3. A requirement that applicants for a position must be between the
ages of 17 and 28. 155
4. The requirement that applicants for a job should not have young
children. 156
5. A refusal to hire people living in a particular area. 157
However, this liberal approach was curtailed by a Court of Appeal decision in






Clarke v Eley (IM/) Kynoch Ltd (1982) IRLR 482 (EAT). The court
ruled that the proportion of women who could fulfil the requirement
to work full time was considerably smaller than the proportion of
men.
The Home Office v Holmes (1 984) IRLR 299 (EAT). The applicant in
this case could not fulfil this requirement after the birth of her child.
Price v Civil Service Commission (1977) IRLR 291 (EAT).
Hurley v Mustoe (1 981) IRLR 208 (EAT).
Hussein v Saints Complete House Furnishers Ltd (1979) IRLR 337.
This case involved the refusal of an employer to hire people living in
an area in Liverpool where the majority (50%) of the population was
black.
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ruled that a requirement or condition must act as an absolute bar to employment
or continued employment. The effect of this decision was that mere preferences
was not sufficient to establish the existence of a requirement or condition.l'"
This decision was also followed in Meer v London Borough of Tower
Hamlets. 159 The Court of Appeal confirmed the lower court decision that the
criterion which related to previous experience at Tower Hamlet was not a "must"
that is not an absolute bar to employment. It was merely a preference of the
employer. It was therefore not a condition or requirement within the meaning of
s. 1 (1 )(b).
The implication of these decisions is that "employers are given a wide prerogative
in matters of selection and promotion". 160 Where criteria are expressed as mere
preferences rather than an absolute bar to employment, applicants who are
indirectly discriminated against as a result of these "preferences" will have no




Perera v Civil Service Commission and Department of Customs and
Excise (No 2) (1 983) IRLR 166 (CA). In this case a number of
selection criteria were used. These included age; practical experience
in England ; ability to communicate in English etc. The court stated
that these requirements were not absolute "musts" without which
the applicant would not succeed. The court reasoned that an
applicant who could not communicate in English could still be
successful if he/she scored highly with regard to the other factors.
(1988) IRLR 399 (CA). This case involved an application by Mr Meer
for the position of Head of the legal department with Tower Hamlets.
There were 23 applicants for the position and 12 were selected for
"long-listing". Mr Meer was not selected. The criteria for long-listing
was: age; date of admission as a solicitor, present post, current
salary, local government experience, London government experience,
length in present post, and Tower Hamlets experience. All the
applicants who had Tower Hamlet experience were placed on the
long-list. Mr Meer contended that this was a requirement that
indirectly discriminated against applicants of Indian origin. He relied
on s. 1 (1) (b) and s. 4(1) (a) of the Race Relations Act of 1976.
Painter & Puttick (1993) at 136.
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It has been observed that "this approach risks undercutting the entire indirect
discrimination concept... ,,,161 since very few hiring practices operate as
absolute bars to employment. Further an employer who is faced with a indirect
discrimination charge could successfully claim that a hiring procedure was a
preference rather than a bar to employment. Because selection processes often
operate in a clandestine manner where the exact reason for the success or failure
is unknown to the candidiate, it would be difficult to refute such a claim.
Recognising the problems inherent in this element of an indirect discrimination
case, there have been suggestions and proposals by the Commission for Racial
Equality and the Equal Opportunities Commission that the wording of the relevant
Acts be expanded to include any practice,policy or situation which has an adverse
impact on one sex or racial group should amount to indirect dlscrirnination.!"
Despite these proposals, the decisions in Perera and Meer were followed in the
1989 decision of Clymo v Wandsworth London Borough Counclt.t" The Court
ruled the refusal of the employer to allow the employee to job-share and the
insistence on full-time employment was not a condition or requirement. It was
rather "the nature of the job". The implication of the judgment was that if a
particular "condition" was part of the nature of the job, Le an inseparable feature
of the job, then it would not be considered a requirement in terms of the SDA.
The uncertainty surrounding the Court's interpretation of "requirement or




Ibid citing Byre A Indirect Discrimination (1987).
This was the proposal of the Commission for Racial Equality in 1985
in Review of the Race Relations Act 1976 : Proposals for Change;
and the Equal Opportunities Commission in 1988 in Equal Treatment
for Men and Women: Strengthening the Acts.
(1989) IRLR 241.
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v North Eastern Education and Library Board1s 4 where the court held that the
after-school attendance was a "requiremenf' or "condition". The court stated that
the fact that the nature of a job requires full time attendance does exclude after-
hours attendance from being regarded as a requirement in terms of the Act.
Although Briggs was not a British case, European trends do not go unnoticed in
Britain. Britain's position as a member of the European Community means that
British national laws must maintain the standards set by the Community. Therefore
the manner in which the element of "requirement or condition" is interpreted in
the European Court of Justice will strongly influence British interpretations. 165
This is an indication that Britain will move towards towards the adoption of the
principles as set out in the proposals of the Commission for Racial Equality and the
Equal Opportunities Commission, as these principles are in line with European
Community principles.
The implication of this interpretation for the plaintiff is significant. This extension
of the meaning of requirement and/or condition to a practice, policy or situation
will bring a diversity of employment practices under attack and simplify the
process of proof for the plaintiff. However, the use of the word "situation" may
result in the casting of too wide a net. The consequences of this broad approach
may result in additional interpretative problems.
4.4.2 Can a considerably smaller proportion of the protected group
comply with the requirement or condition?
There were two problematic issues that emerged under this requirement. Firstly,
164
165
(1990) IRLR 181 . Briggs, a school teacher was required to paticipate
in extra-curricular teaching duties after school hours. She requested
relief from these duties after the adoption of a baby. She was told
that this request would be granted but that she would receive a
demotion as a result of it. Briggs argued that this requirement of after
school attendance had an adverse impact on women.
Hunter (1992) at 23.
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how does the complainant prove the disparate impact of the condition, that is that
there is "a considerably smaller proportion of the protected group" who can
comply. And secondly, what is the meaning of "can comply"?
In proving that the proportion of one sex/race group that can comply with the
condition or requirement is considerably smalle r, the use of statistical evidence is
allowed. However, unlike the American approach where statistical evidence is
regarded as imperative in proving this element, British courts have taken the
approach that statistical evidence is not essential in proving this element if it is
possible to do so without their use.!" Noting the problems assosciated with
statistical proof in the US, this informal method of proving disparate impact has
definite advantages for the British plaintiff w ho is not burdened with gathering
complex data. 16 7
A further issue facing British courts was the dilemma of deciding on the correct
"pool" for comparison. In Price v Civil Service Commission the EAT held that the
appropriate comparison was between men and women who possessed the
necessary qualification. The reason afforded for limiting the "pool" to people who
possessed the necessary qulaifications was because it was only this group that
could be adversley affected by the age requirement.
166
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Perera v Civil Service Commission and Department Of Customs and
Excise(N02) (1983) IRLR 166 (CA) and Briggs v North Eastern
Education and Library Board (1990) IRLR 181 (NICA) where the court
stated that tribunals were not barred from taking their own
knowledge and experience into account in determining whether a
requirement or condition had a disparate impact on a protected
group.
See also 0' Donovan K and Szyszczak E 11 Indirect Discrimination _
Taking a Concept to Market - /I" (1985) New Law Journal 42 at 42
where it was said that ... "there is a growing tendency for tribunals
to rely on common sense knowledge rather than hard empirical
evidence." .
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This early decision was confirmed in Pearse v City of Bradford Metrapo/itan
Council 68 . Ms Pearse was a part-time lecturer who was unable to apply for a
full time post at the college where she worked because the only persons eligible
to apply were full-time employees of the local authority. Pearse submitted
statistical evidence which showed that only 21 .8 per cent of the female academic
staff employed by the college worked on a full-time basis as compared to 46.7 per
cent of the male staff who worked full-time. The court, however, rejected the
selected pool of comparison. The EAT ruled that the correct pool for comparison
would have been those with the appropriate qualifications for the post, rather than
the those who were eligible because of the full-time nature of their employment.
Although these judgements confirmed each other, consistency in the approach of
choosing the correct pool of comparison was hindered by the EAT decision in Kidd
v DRG (UK) Ltd. 169 The court held that the choice of a correct pool was an issue
of fact within the discretion of the tribunal. The advantage of this approach would
be the flexibility that would allow consideration of the circumstances of individual
cases. However I there are inherent dangers in this approach. Consistency in the
application of principles will be hindered. Further too much faith is placed in the
tribunals to apply its discretion without any formula or principles to base its
decision.
The Kidd court held further that on the issue of how small a proportion should be
before it can be regarded as considerable was also a matter of personal opinion.
This has differed greatly from the US position where the courts tend to abide by
the eighty per cent rule or 4/5 rule as proposed by the EEOC. Although there are
problems with this American approach, the dangers involved in an approach that
relies on personal opinion are all too clear . Personal opinion allows the infiltration
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Mandla v Lee the court examined whether a Sikh schoolboy could comply with the
school's uniform requirement and remove his turban. The court ruled that ·can
comply" should be interpreted as meaning ·can in practice" or "can consistently
with the customs and cultural conditions of the racial group". 170 It should not
be misinterpreted or misconstured as meaning "theoretically possible".
This was also the decision in Price v The Civil Service Commission and Society of
Civil and Public Servents.i" The EAT ruled that "It should not be said that a
person 'can' do something merely because it is theoretically possible for him to
do so; it is necessary to see whether he can do so in practice". 172 Thus although
it was theoretically possible for a woman to meet the maximum age requirement
of 28 years by not having children during these years, it was not possible in
practice.
These decisions are of great significance to sex and gender discrimination. Often
women can theoretically work on a full-time basis. However, the obligations that
women face outside work make this impossible in practice. This approach takes
into account the real situation of women and must be commended.
4.4.3 Has the condition or requirement operated to the detriment of
the complainant?
Race and sex legislation in Britain has included the additional element of suffering
a detriment. Therefore, under British law it is insufficient to show that a condition
or requirement has an adverse impact. The complaining party must also show that
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In Price the employer argued that it is possible for women not to have
children in their 20's. This would enable them to comply with the civil
service maximum entry age of 28. Although this was possible in
theory, it was impossible in practice.
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motive behind the inclusion of the element is to separate the real victims from
concerned citizens and to "prevent hypothetical test cases from swamping the
tribunals". 173
4.4.4 Can the Employer Justify the Condition or Requirement?
In Britain the defence available to an employee once the employee has proved· a
prima facie case of indirect discrimination is that the requirement or condition
which has been applied must be justifiable irrespective of the gender, race or
marital status of the person to whom it is applied.
Initially, the courts approach was in line with the Griggs judgement. In Steel v The
Post Office174 the EAT stated that a practice is not justifiable unless its
discrimnatory effect is justified by the need, not convenience, of the business or
enterprise.
However, in Ojutiku and Oburoni v Manpower Services Commission'?" the
necessity defence was substantially weakened when the Court of Appeal took the
view th~t where a person produces reasons for doing something which would be
acceptable to right thinking people as sound and tolerable reasons for doing so,
then he has justified his conduct. This effectively diluted the test of
justifiability176 and in effect reduced the burden on the employer.
However, in Hampson v Department of Science"? the Court of Appeal in
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that the test for justifability requires striking a balance between the discriminatory
effect of the condition or requirement and the needs of the employer.
Although the Hampson judgment can be commended for its departure from
Ojutiku, it resulted in the creation of another problem. This problem was
formulated as follows:
The difficulty is that in balancing the employer's needs against those of a women who has
suffered discrimnatory treatment, corporate needs may automatiically assume greater
weight. 178
The "balancing of interests approach" is thus problematic especially in the British
context where courts are accustomed to applying "well adjusted" Iaws.!" Thus
it is clearly evident that in adapting the adverse impact model to the British
system, some of the problems experienced in America in proving indirect
discrimination were avoided. However, in the same instance new problems in
proving indirect discrimination arose that were distinctively British. Therefore, the
British Courts in their attempt to avoid the problems experienced in America,
created several new problems for themselves.
178
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Painter & Puttick (1993) at 140 citing Morris and Nott Working
Women and the Law : Equality and Discrimination in Theory and
Practice (1991) at 88.
See Hervey T.K "Justification for indirect discrimination in
employment: European and UK law compared" (1991) Vol 40
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 807 at 810 where the
European Court decision of Bilka- Kaufhaus v Weber von Hertz
([1986) 2 C.M.L.R. 701 is discussed. The case represented a return.
!o ~~e ~trict stand.ard of Griggs by formulating an objective
Justification test which comprises of the following elements : an
objective criterion; a genuine need; suitable and necessary for that
purpose. The author does, however, state that later British decisions
indicate a reluctance to follow the E.C. decision.
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4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
A discussion of the law and case development in America and Britain was
necessary for two reasons. It indicates the manner in which the indirect
discrimination concept adopts a significantly different character as a result of the
influence of the legislative and judicial systems of that country. Also it indicates
that often a problem addressed in one country may be ignored in another.
Thus the discussion of the development of indirect or adverse impact
discrimination in the major countries of the Western world has brought to the fore
important legal principles and problems experienced in proving indirect
discrimination. However, integral to the sucess of any indirect discrimination
legislation is the ability of protected groups such as women to recognize a
situation in which they have been indirectly discriminated. This can only be
achieved by identifing the policy or condition or requirement that is the cause of
the alleged adverse impact.
5 EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS THAT
INDIRECTLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WOMEN IN
EMPLOYMENT
This identification of the discriminatory policy or condition of employment is of
great significance when dealing with sex and gender discrimination. Social
perceptions and stereotypes about women have resulted in a situation where these
requirements or conditions have been internalized by the workplace to the extent
that they are often viewed by employers and employees as "normal, natural,
common".
Thus even with the introduction of indirect discrimnation legislation these
conditions and requirements continue to dominate the employment arena because
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of their "accepted" status. Often they will operate in a manner which deters
female applicants from applying in the first instance.
Therefore it is imperative that this study include an identification and examination
of the conditions and requirements that have an adverse impact on women in
employment. 18o The purpose of this section is to create an awareness of the
common types of suspect requirements or conditions .or policies.
5.1 REQUIREMENTS
The nature of work necessitates the insistence by an employer on the fufilment of
certain criteria when candidates apply for a position or promotion. Generally these
requirements will be an inherent feature of the job in question, that is, the work
required of the applicant cannot be accomplished without the fulfilment of these
criteria. However, requirements for a position or promotion are often unrelated to
the job at issue. Such requirements tend to perpetuate prejudices and social
perceptions about women.
5.1.1 Physical requirements
The labour market has provided an active arena for the predominance and
perpetuation of the social perception of the worker as being an able bodied
rnale.!'" This has had severe implications on the availability of certain positions
to women. Where there is an insistance on physical attributes that are distinctly




Some of these conditions may have been mentioned or discussed to
some extent in the previous section.
Hunter (1992) at 122.
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This was evidenced in the US case of Dothard v Rawlinson182 where there was
a height requirement of 5 feet 2 inches for prison guards. The effect of this
requirement was that it excluded one-third of the female population of the US and
only 1% of the total male population. There was also a minimum weight
requirement of 150 pounds which had a similar effect of excluding a significantly
larger proportion of women as compared to men for employment.
The reasoning behind these physical requirements is usually because of the
security type positions that are being offered and/or that the position requires an
element of strength. However, these physical requirements are often founded on
social perceptions rather than actual job requirements.
Society has viewed man as the element of strength, that is, the traditional hunter.
This view of man is founded on the "... uncritical acceptance of the myth that
women are the weaker sex. ,,183 There may be some substance to this view since
it is a biological fact that generally men are physically stronger than women.
However, these biological differences that have now developed into social
prejudices have resulted in the assumption that all women are not strong. 184
Based on these assumptions, an employer will justify the necessity of these
physical requirements by stating that a certain level of strength is required for a




433 US 321 (1977).
Campanella J "A mandate to discriminate" (1993) Vol 9 No.5
Employment Law 102 at 102.
Ibid at 103. The author criticised the decision of the Industrial Court
in Ntsangani v Golden Lay Farms (1992) 13 ILJ 1199 (IC) where the
LlFO policy was abandoned where special skills were involved. The
ability to perform heavy work was interpreted as a special skill.
Therefore only women were retrenched because they performed
"light" work. The author states that this view of "heavy" work as "..
a special skill which only men can possess ... appears to have been
nothing more than an untested perception or assumption.
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"impression of aggressiveness and intimidation".185 These justifications are
based on the premise that strength is necessarily derived from weight and height
factors and that an applicant's ability to be aggressive and intimidating has
nothing to do with his/her state of mind, that is, his/her character, and everything
to do with physical attributes. This is as ludricrous as suggesting that in addition
to the necessary academic qualifications, a judge should satisfy certain height and
weight requirements in order to maintain order in the courtroom and create an
image of authority.
Thus it has become increasingly necessary to evaluate these physical requirements
in order to determine whether they are genuine job requirements or whether they
..... remain [to] serve merely to perpetuate the image of maleness surrounding
those positions. ,,186 This will involve an evaluation of the requirements for the
job in question. Rosemary Hunter advises that an employer who wishes to avoid
claims of indirect discrimination would "need to look carefully at what aspect of
job performance the requirement was designed to measure, and to see whether
there was some other, less discriminatory way of measuring that attribute, or
indeed whether that attribute was actually necessary to job performance.,,187
Hunter provides an example which illustrates the manner in which such an
evaluation was accomplished.
A South Australian Fire Service stipulated that applicants must have a minimum chest
measurement of 96 .5 cm. After a complaint to the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity, the
requirement was deleted in favour of a specific lung capacity test which offered women
a fairer opportunity to comply. The service also set different body fat tests as a measure
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Therefore these requirements can only be said to be "valid when they provide
accurate predictions of job performance. Where tests relate to physical or
functional attributes, it will be necessary to determine whether those attributes are
genuinely required for successful job performance (which ofcourse requires
accurate job analysis to begin with)".189
A further problem facing women is that even where a female applicant is able to
meet these physical requirements, she is often unsuccessful in the final selection
process where she is "measured" against taller, heavier men. This "best man for
the job" approach ensures that the applicant chosen is a male even though a
female applicant has fulfilled all the requirements in order to perform the job
successfully. Thus the criteria used in the final selection processes must also be
questioned if their effect has an adverse impact on women.
5.1.2 Formal experience and educational qualifications
The insistence on formal experience and educational qualifications is often
.unquestioned. The reason for this may be attributed to the value system of our
labour market which rates skilled positions over unskilled positions. This value
system also places importance on experience gained in the formal labour market
in paid positions. This approach has had an adverse impact on women in
employment.
The life patterns of women are often dictated by the social responsibilites of the
female population. Most women find themselves performing "shadow work" in the
home by caring for children and performing other domestic duties. This work is
almost always unpaid and its importance to society greatly undervalued. Women
who manage to accommodate a work life into this domestic life pattern are often
found in part-time low status positions or work on a voluntary basis on community




"values formal qualifications and/or experience in paid positions for selection I
1
I
purposes but discountlsl experience and skills gained in an unpaid I
capacity.... ,,190 women find themselves in a disadvantaged position.
It has been stated:
A woman interviewed in one study commented that -too much emphasis on education for
a caring job is not required. Experience as a mother is undervalued by employers, but you
gain a lot of skills from that experience- .191
There is also the general presumption that skills are gained by attaining formal
educational qualifications. In short, a "good" employee is a graduated one.
Educational requirements "are predicated on the assumption that high school
graduates will be able to achieve in industry because they have been able to
achieve in school. Yet it cannot be assumed that people only leave school because
of inability to achieve. Furthermore, graduation merely demonstrates an ability to
pass school tests, which are not designed to predict job pertorrnance";""
As already discussed in the first section of this work,' the role of women as
I
primarily care-givers of their offspring and responsible for domestic tasks has
resulted in a retarded entrance of women into the educational sphere. Because of
this inequality of educational qualifications between the sexes, an insistence on
educational requirements will have the effect of excluding more women than men
from selection.
In many instances educational qualifications may be an accurate measure of the
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insistence on a certain level of educational qualifications has little to do with !
fulfilling the functions required from the job-at-issue. It may in fact represent an \
unintended and unconscious manner of reproducing a workforce that is male l
dominated.
This creates a need to analyse the jobs in question and to determine whether the
qualifications asked for are necessary for the performance of the jobs-at-issue.
The kind of job involved determines the degree of scrutiny... unskilled work requiring
educational qulaificatins would be suspect. Requirements for high school diplomas and
f fessi I . . lso be ouesti d .193college degrees or non-pro ssrona posmons must a s q strone .
Further often aptitude tests that are intended to measure the suitability of an
applicant for a position will emphasise skills such as maths and science abilities.
As also discussed earlier, the domination of males in the mathematical and
scientific fields will encourage test results that tend to favour male applicants over
female appucants.!" Obviously where a position requires science and
mathematical skills, this form of testing would be acceptable. However, where
such skills or the level of skills tested are not required for the position in question,
such a test will serve merely to adversely effect women.
Often the skills and educational requirements required on entrance into a particular
job, are only necessary once the applicant has received a promotion to a higher
level within that company or are skills that the applicant could have gained through
on-the-job experience. Thus it is imperative that an investigation be conducted into
whether such tests and educational requirements are an accurate measure of the
ability to perform the job that is being applied for.
193
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Age limitations in advertisements for jobs are common place. Often such
limitations insist on applicants in their mid twenties to thirties.l'" The popular
employer reasoning behind these age limits is.that "organisations often prefer their
career stream recruits to be young, hoping to produce in the future a flow to senior
positions of personnel who are mature yet still dynamic, and who have absorbed
enough of the organisation's culture to be safely entrusted with its
maintenance". 196
However, this age period which is regarded as most viable by employers is also the
reproductive years of female employees. This conflict has resulted in the exclusion
of women from career opportunutities because they are significantly absent from
the labour market caring for young children during this period. Once they enter or
re-enter the labour market, as the case may be, they find themselves competing
with men of their age group who have years of job experience and educational
qualifications.
These age requirements need to be assessed. Careful inspection may reveal the
tendency to favour the normal worker as a young male without child care
responsibilities. The reason for such age requirements must receive careful
examination to deduce whether the age group required is the only that can fulfil
the functions required of the job. A lot may be said for the argument that
employees of an older age may enter the labour market with a sense of maturity
and responsibity that the employer will find beneficial to his/her organisation.
195
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In Price v Civil Service Commission (1976) IRLR 405; (1978) ICR 27;
(1978) IRLR 3 at 5 the applicants had to be under the age of 28.
This had the effect of directly discriminating against women.
Hunter (1992) at 151. This reasoning is, however, based on the
socially prejudicial supposition that older individuals are incapable of
being dynamic or absorbing the culture of the organisation.
5.1.4 Mobility and Seniority
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Often the criteria for promotion and advancement in employment are based on
"unquestioned organisational imperatives, such as the ability to serve where the
organisation requires an uninterrupted length of service". 197
Women are less capable of complying with these requirements than men. In most
situations the female supplies a secondary income to the family unit. Thus it is
unlikely that a female will be in the position to uproot her children and her spouse
in order to fulfil a job requirement of mobility.
Mobility is not only assosciated with promotional benefits. Often mobility is
required of employees for training purposes. The very nature of a woman's role
in society reduces the chances of her becoming mobile in order to receive training
and thereby improve her working conditions. The necessity and reasonableness of
mobility requirements must be weighed against the possibility of receiving training
in some other manner. This will necessitate a departure from past policies in order
to take into account the "typical life patterns of women".198
Further employment policies that render promotions dependant on the length of
service or seniority have an adverse impact on women who are less capable than
men of conducting an uninterrupted work life because of child care responsibilites.
Thus women often lose out on promotions and other benefits such as bonuses
because they are unable to conform to the male norm of an uninterrupted work
life. This male norm is based on the premise that the private life of a employee
must be distinct from the public or working life of that employee. This is only
possible in the male situation where being married and having children offers little
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contrast to a female, who is greatly inhibited in her work life by marriage and child
care responsibilties. Policies that promote seniority and mobility fail to recognize
these constraints. ]
The justification of seniority requirements is that "seniority goes hand in hand with
experience which generally places a worker in a better position to carry out his
duties...199 It may for the most part hold true that seniority is indicative of good
job performance. However, often seniority systems serve only to "perpetuate the
effects of past discrimination". 200
In Steel v. Union of Post Office Workers201 women postal workers were denied permanent
status until 1975 when the UK SDA came into force. From that date women were employed
on the same terms as men their seniority running form the date of permanence. As a result
one woman who had been employed since 1961 lost out in a competition for a walk
allocated on the basis of seniority to a man who had gained permanence in 1973. The post
office conceded that its seniority requirement was one with which a smaller proportion of
woman than men could comply. The Employment Appeals Tribunal approved the use of
indirect discrimination provisions to remove the effects of past discrlmlnation.j'"
Thus in view of the adverse impact of seniority and mobility clauses on women,
the general acceptability of such requirements must be discarded in preference for
an approach that is cautious in that does not assume the reasonableness of these
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5.2 CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ;::/
5.2.1 Part-time work
As explained earlier, j due to the life patterns of women, there tends to be a
I
concentration of women in part-time employment. The predominance of women
in part-time(emPloyment is not the subject of this discussion. The evil aimed at
here is theJin~:ri~r conditions and terms of employment that characterises par~- )
time jobs. f hese inferior condit~ons tend " adversely affect ""?" emPlo:ed 1nl
these positions. The down playing of part-time work once again can be attributed
I
to the domination of the male norm. The workplace is liIsaturated by male
!
values".203 These values encourage full-time employment and regard full-time
I
workers as making a significant contribution to the labour market. It has beE1n
pointed out that "the treatment of part-time workers as second-class citizefs
stems from the fact that within the masculine universe, part-time work is regard~d
as synonymous with optional, short-term and/or casual work". 204 "
This has resulted in the deprivation of benefits to the part-time Worker. Hunter
provides examples of policies and conditions of employment that have been
responsible for the creation of the inferior status of part-time work. 205 Some of
these include the refusal to allow part-time employees to apply for promotion; the
denial of benefits such as bonuses, allowances, housing subsidies, leave to part- "
time workers; low pay; and a redundancy sheme which provides for selecting part-
timers first.
These conditions of employment of part-time workers must be assessed. The
argument that women can attain better work conditions for themselves by
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an option or a solution for most women.
For many women ...part-time work ia a permanent and necessary arrangement that allows
them adequately to fulfill both domestic and financial and/or intellectual imperatives. 206
Thus employers are advised to attach the same degree of importance to part-time
work. It is a permanent and undeniable feature of employment. To avoid indirect
discrimination charges, the conditions affecting part-time employment must be re-
evaluated.
Further, the archaic view of the employee as a full-time worker must be
questioned. Improvement of conditions of part-time workers as well as
accomodating full-time female employees who can no longer fulfil the
commitments of full-time work must be encouraged. Such accommodation can
take the form of flexible hours or job sharing.
207
Employers may argue against this accommodation on efficiency grounds. However,
it has been suggested that:
...the provision of flexible work options makes economic sense in terms of increased






In Carey v Greater Glascow Health Board a Scottish court allowed a
health worker to work on a job-sharing basis after maternity leave. In
Wright v Rugby Council the court 11... provide[d) a basis for women
to challenge rigid working hours where flexibility is needed for child
care purposes. In this case the applicant asked if she could come to
work half an hour late and take only half an hour lunch break to allow
her to deliver and collect her child. An industrial Tribunal ruled that
a failure to vary working hours would amount to indirect sex
discrimination" [see Hunter (1992) at 158].
Hunter (1992) at 158.
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Therefore employers would be best advised to investigate the business advantages
of such a programme.
5.2.2 After-Hours Obligations
\
An informal condition of employment may take the form of after hour work I
obligations. "An expectation that employees will socialise with colleagues and I
customers out of hours ....operatelsl as a constraint on women's I
employment".209 After-work obligations may also take the form of attending I
conferences or training programmes. According to Hunter, the domestic and child!
I
care responsibilities of women reduce the ability of women to comply with theSe!
requirements."? This is because of the conflicting roles of employee and
mother/wife. Women are therefore left with little opportunity to further theil
!
education and training thereby limiting their advancement opportunitites. i
r
The neccessity of after-hour obligations must be questioned and the possibility of
providing for training programmes during working hours must be looked at .
5.3 RECRUITMENT POLICIES
The danger of recruitment policies is in the uncertainty of the criteria being used I.
to select applicants. Often interviews are the basis of selection. Over and above 1
the general requirements for a job, it is an often taken-for-granted custom that the
"impression" created by an applicant at an interview carries great weight in
determining success or failure. However, the impression created is determined by \.,
those judging the behaviour of the applicant. I
;,
Thus " an interview panel .. . composed entirely of men and ... more familiar with






proven effectiveness only in relation to male presentation stvles", 211 Therefore
female applicants who possess the official requirements for a job are excluded
from selection because they lack a "second set of characteristics, associated with
traditional male incurnbentst.!"
This perpetuation of male characteristics by interviewing panels has been termed
"homosocial raprocuctrorr.?" It has been observed that:
A supervisor who is judging a subordinate for promotion potential tends to look for traits
in the subordinate which the supervisor feels he himself has".214
Therefore there is a need for clearly defined job pre-requisites or the dominant
workplace culture will reproduce itself. 215
Thus having identified some practices or requirements that tend to indirectly
discriminate against women, it is important to note that this is not an exhausted
list. The above discussion is an indication of the common types of conditions and
requirements that operate in an indirectly discriminatory manner against women.
However, the recognition of indrect discrimination practices is insufficient if this
recognition is not made within the framework of a legal system that effectively
prohibits indirect discrimination. The following section will examine this legal
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South African society has not escaped the restrictive social patterns that
distinguish the role of men and women. "South Africa has been described as a
patriarchal society". 216 This description encompasses the idea of man as the
leader and ruler of his family. It also encompasses the idea of a distinct division of
labour whereby women are exclusively responsible for domestic tasks such as
child care, cleaning and cooking. These tasks are seen as duties that are inherently
"female" and are unpaid. "Paid work generally is regarded as the domain of
men".217 This division of roles is evident not only in Western cultures in South
Africa. It is also a significant feature of African, Hindu and Muslim cultures. Thus
traditionally, across the wide spectrum of cultures in South Africa, women
remained absent from the workplace.
Today, however, it may be argued that the term "patriarchal society" is a
misnomer because the traditional distinction of roles between men and women in
modern South African society have been dissolved. Such an argument can only be
described as presumptious. It is true that due to a variety of socio-economic
reasons women have made a significant entrance into the workplace. But does this
new role of women in employment indicate a departure from their more traditional
roles? Simply, has paid work resulted in the emancipation of women from the
inferiority that was assosciated with their domestic role?
Societal trends do not indicate such an emancipation. The stereotypes that
emerged as a result of the patriarchal division of labour continue to disadvantage
women. Furthermore, the changing the role of women in society has resulted in
additional burdens and responsibilites. The Green Paper on Employment Equity
states that "[w]omen typically face the burden of unpaid household labour in
216
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addition to generating an income".218 This combined with educational factors
which indicate a disparity between the sexes in the level of education received,
has been responsible for the inequitable situation that women now find themselves
in employment.
These difficulties facing South African women in employment is a reflection of
international trends. However in South Africa the inequity faced by women in
employment is compounded by past racial discrimination. This has added to the
complexity of the situation in South Africa . This work does not aim to explain the
interaction between race and gender. The vastness of such a topic warrants an
independent study. The aim of this section is to address indirect discrimination
\
legislation provisions in South Africa which apply to all women irrespective of race.
6. 1 LEGAL RECOGNITION OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA
The transformation from an apartheid society to a "new political, social and legal
order [which professes tol place a high emphasis on freedom, human dignity and
equality of every individual citizen" necessitated the formulation of legislation that
outlawed discrimination.F" The Constitution of South Africa represented a
significant move in that direction.
The concept of indirect discrimination first appeared in the form of a clause in the
Interim Constitution of the Republic of south Africa. This same clause was later
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(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, rnantal status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
22o
There are two important features regarding the wording of this section that come
to the fore. Firstly, the use of the word "unfairlv" indicates that the Constitution
anticipated circumstances when discrimination would be regarded as "fairl!. This
was later evidenced by the formulation of a national affirmative action policy that
is aimed at addressing past discrimination.
Secondly, the use of the words "one or more" indicates that a claim could be
brought on more than one ground at the same time. For example, sex as well as
race. This indicates a willingness by the legislature to accommodate circumstances
where there exists an interaction of two or more grounds that have a
discriminatory effect. This would guard against the artificial and cumbersome
exercise of attempting to fit the discrimination complained of into one of the
prohibited grounds. It would also allow a complainant who failed on the ground of
sex to succeed on the alternative selected ground. This must be commended as
a realistic approach especially in the South African context where "Iwle ... often
find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives
they are most often experienced simultaneously". 221
Finally the words "one or more" indicate that this is not an exhaustive list and
therefore indirect discrimination on other unmentioned grounds, such as marital
status, may also succeed.
220
221
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996:
Chapter 2, Bill of Rights: section 9(3) and (4).
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With regard to the proving of discrimination, the Constitution stated :
Discrimination on one or more grounds listed in subsectionts) is unfair unless it is
established that the discrimination is fair. 222
This section did not make reference to any defence to indirect discrimination.
Neither did it explain what degree of proof would satisfy the "sufficient"
requirement. This was a general enactment, the purpose of which was to provide
a general protection and an impetus towards the formulation and introduction of
more comprehensive legislation on discrimination.
This general clause in the Constitution was reproduced and added to, in the Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995, in order to facilitate its application in labour.




For the purposes of this item, an unfair labour practice means any unfair act or .
omission that arises between an employer and an employee, involving-
(a) the unfair discrimination, either directly or indirectly, against an employee on
any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, diability, religion, conscience,
belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital status or family
responsibility;
For the purposes of sub-item (1) (a) -
(a) "employee" includes an applicant for employment
(b) an employer is not prevented from adopting or implementing employment
policies and practices that are designed to achieve the adequate protection
and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms; and
(c) any discrimination based on an inherent requirement of the particular job does
not constitute unfair discrimination.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996
Chapter 2 Bill of Rights: s 9(5). '
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. This section signified a departure from past labour legislation in that it was the first
time that applicants for employment were afforded protection. This is of particular
significance to indirect discrimination cases because it is often at the threshold of
employment that indirect discrimination is most evident. Further, following in the
foot- steps of the Constitution, the Labour Relations Act provided specifically that
affirmative action policies that aimed at advancing previously disadvantaged
groups would escape an attack of discrimination.
Finally and of greatest significance was the incorporation of the defence of the
"inherent job requirements". This defence was first formulated by the International
Labour Organization at its Discrimination (Employment and Occcupation)
Convention in 1958. 223 The Convention stated that "... any distinction, exclusion
or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements
thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination".224
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "inherent" as a "permanent and
characteristic attribute". This suggests a strict standard. Therefore, requirements
that cannot be removed from the job in question without dramatically altering the
nature of the job will be regarded as inherent requirements. A job that can be
performed without the imposition of such requirements will fail this standard.
It has been suggested that the principles established in the British Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975 should be used as guidance in determining whether a




International Labour Organisation Convention No. 111 of 1958.
Ibid at Article 1(2).
Du Toit 0, Woolfrey 0, Murphy J, Godfrey S, Bosch 0 & Christie S
in The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) at 403. See also Grogan
J Workplace Law (2nd ed) (1997) at 168.
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Discrimination Act include authenticity/26 the need to preserve privacy and
decencl27; and the nature of the establishment or the part of it in which the
work is done. 228 These criteria will provide useful guidelines for South African
cases.
This defence is a welcome departure from international trends. The American
defence of "business necessity" and/or "job relatedness" and the British defence
of "justifiability" were often interpreted in a manner which allowed discrimination
if business reasons, such as efficiency and profitability, were offered. Noted, the
interpretation of the defence in these countries received a rollercoaster reception
in that the defence also received strict interpretation. But this led to confusion and
inconsisitency in the courts' approach. Thus South Africa in applying this strict
standard, will hopefully find itself better equipped to apply this defence and
prevent the judicial errors that were made abroad.
A further section relating to indirect discrimination can be found in section 187 (f)
of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. This section states that a dismissal will be
regarded as automatically unfair if the reason for the dismissal is:
...that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any




According to Grogan (1997) at 168, footnote 4, 'authenticity' refers
to "possession by the employee of some inherent attribute [which]
is an essential characteristic of the role he or she is to perform."
An example of such a situation would be where a female nurse is
required in a hospital ward for women.
In Diaz v Pan American Airways Inc. 442 F2d 1273 (9th Cir) (1981)
the nature of the establishment was considered and the employer
justified his employment of females only, for the position of flight
attendants by stating that that the position required compassion
which was necessary to calm nervous or timid passengers. However,
this justification was based on the assumption that men did not
posse~s compassion. The case also addressed the issue of the degree
to which customer preference should be allowed to determine the
acceptability of a requirement.
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colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience. belief, political opinion,
culture, language, marital status or family responsibility.
(2) Despite subsection (1) (f) -
(a) a dismissal may be fair if the reason for the dismissal is based on an inherent
requirement of the job;
(b) a dismissal based on age if the employee has reached the normal or agreed
retirement age for persons employed in that category.
This section is a reproduction of Schedule 7 Item 2. However, of great importance
is the status granted to dismissals based on reasons related to direct or indirect
discrimination. Such dismissals will be regarded as automatically unfair unless the
defence of inherent job requirements as explained in the above paragraph is
successful. This status of an automatically unfair dismissal indicates the
importance that the Labour Relations Act placed on outlawing discrimination i,n
employment.
There are also various comparative law issues that emerge from these sections.
Firstly, the introduction of the concept of indirect discrimination in South Africa
occurred by means of legislation as it did in Britain. However, unlike British law,
South Africa has no seperate legislation dealing exclusively and directly with
discrimination. The question that must be asked is whether there is a need for a
separate discrimination statute or whether the provisions in the Constitution and
the Labour Relations Act are sufficient. This issue will be dealt with later.
Secondly, by specifically including indirect discrimination in the aforementioned
Acts, the legislature has indicated that it has taken note of the initial problems
experienced in America and Canada where the exclusion of indirect discrimination
provisions and a definition of discrimination, led the courts to initally interpret
discrimination as encompassing direct discrimination only, that is discrimination
with intent. The specific inclusion of indirect discrimination has curtailed any
potential debate as to whether the legislature intended the inclusion of indirect
discrimination.
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However, although the Constitution and the Labour Relations Act have included
the concept of indirect discrimination, both Acts failed to define the term. Perhaps
relying on the wealth of international information and case development on the
subject our courts will turn to international sources for a detailed definition. This
has already been evidenced in some early indirect and direct discrimination cases.
Thirdly, South African indirect discriminatcion provisions do not follow in the foot-
steps of their British counterparts, in that a detailed step-by-step procedure for
proving indirect discrimination is not reflected in either the Constitution or the
Labour Relations Act.
Perhaps the reason behind this was to allow the courts the opportunity to create
a balance between the American and the British approaches, to prevent an endless
semantic debate and to allow for a measure of judicial discretion in developing a
procedure for proving indirect discrimination. It will be interesting to see whether
the courts choose to rely on the American liberal approach or the more
conservative British approach.
An alternative reason for the exclusion of a more detailed section on indirect
discrimination could be that the complexity of an indirect discrimination case was
never within the contemplation of the legislation when it drew up the Constitution
and the Labour Relations Act. If this is the case, this will have serious implications
for future indirect discrimination cases in South Africa.
It is therefore necessary, in the light of the above discussion to examine the
manner in which indirect discrimination cases have been dealt with by our courts.
6.2 SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW
The cases that discuss the concept of indirect discrimination are few. It is
remarkable that, in a country that has voluntarily turned its back on lawful
discrimination, claims based on discrimination, either direct or indirect, seem to be
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appearing out of the woodwork in a reluctant and cautious manner.
The first South African case that dealt with the issue of indirect discrimination
arose during the era of the 1956 Labour Relations Act, that is, before any labour
legislation outlawing indirect discrimination existed. In Col/ins v Volkskas Bank
(Westonaria Branch) A Division of ABSA Bank Ltcf29 the court dealt with the
issue of whether an employment policy that allowed for a period of 3 to 5 months'
maternity leave subject to the condition that after maternity leave had been
granted, such leave would not be granted again unless two years of service had
passed since the last period of maternity leave had been taken, was an unfair
labour practice in terms of section 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act of 1956. The
plaintiff alleged direct discrimination.
In deciding the case the court looked at section 8(2) of the Constitution and Article
5(e) of the ILO Convention 158 of 1982, which states that absence from work
during maternity leave shall not constitute a valid reason for dismissal. (It is
interesting to note that had this case occurred after the enactment of the 1995
LRA, this would be regarded as an automatically unfair disrnissal.)
The respondent's argument was that this was not sex discrimination because the
real reason for the employee's dismissal was her incapacity and the fact that the
reason for her incapacity affected women only did not make the policy
discriminatory. The court saw this as the opportune moment to introduce the
concept of indirect discrimination. The court referred to the ILO Convention 111 of
1958 and the defence of "inherent job requirements". However, relying on the
Griggs judgment the court interpreted the defence as one of "business
neccessity". On the basis of this defence, the court stated that the policy could
not be justified on the basis of the operational requirements of the business.
229 (1 994) 5 (9) SALLR 34 uci.
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The principle established in this case is that there must be a valid commercial
rationale for an employment policy. This approach was in fact highly criticised in
the US and the UK as it places greater importance on business values of
profitability and efficiency than the discriminatory impact of policies on employees.
Also of great significance to future indirect discrimination cases was the non-
interventionist approach adopted by the court with regard to policies that were a
result of collective agreements. Marcus AM stated that "only if such an agreement
results in a manifestly gross unfair labour practice being perpetrated against an
individual member or employee, would this court be possibly justified in intervening
or striking down the provisions of a collective agreement".230
The problem with this approach is all too clear. In awarding . informal judicial
protection to collective agreements, the court was placing higher priority on
collective agreements rather than their possible discriminatory effects. Although
the aim of the 1956 and the 1995 Labour Relations Acts was to encourage
collective bargaining, it is doubtful whether the legislature intended to afford this
degree of protection to collective agreements. Perhaps the reasoning behind this
part of the judgment was the voluntary and cooperative nature of a collective
agreement. However, individuals who join a union do not, in agreeing to be bound
by collective agreements entered into by that union and the employer, also consent




Col/ins v Volkskas Bank (1994) 5 (9) SALLR 34 (IC) at 41 .
see also Campanella J "A mandate to discriminate" (1993) Vol 9 No.
5 Employment Law 102 at 104 where the author comments on the
Industrial court's deference to collective bargaining in Ntsangani v
Golden Lay Farms (1992) 13 ILJ 1199 (IC). "To sanction gender
discrimination just because it is the product of a collective bargaining
.agreement is incorrect.... some aspects of fairness must remain
beyond the sphere of autonomy created by collective bargaining.
Discrimination is one such area. The value which equality has as a
norm or principle of fairness should not be subordinated to the value
of collective bargaining."
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In the following year the Industrial Court drew a distinction between the concepts
of direct and indirect discrimination in Association of Professional Teachers &
Another v Minister Of Education And Others.i" In doing so, the Court referred
to the American case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States
where the court stated:
Claims of disparate treatment, which involve employer's alleged treatment of some people
less favourably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and
as to which proof of discriminatory motive is critical, may be distinguished from claims that
stress disparate impact, which involve employment practices that are facially neutral in thier
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another
and cannot be justified by business necessity.233
The court also referred to the Canadian decision of Ontario Human Rights
Commission v Simpsorrs Sears Ltd. In this decision the court stated that adverse
impact discrimination "arises where an employer ... adopts a rule or standard
which is on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to all employees, but
which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground on one employee or
group of employees in that it imposes, because of some special characteristic of
the employee or group, obligations, penalties or restrictive conditions not imposed
on other members of the workforce". 234
The court, relying on the Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964, referred to
s 703(e) where provision was made for the "bona fide occupational qualification"
defence. The Industrial Court interpreted this as meaning the "inherent




(1995) 16 ILJ 1048 (IC). Although this case involved a home
owner's policy that discriminated directly against women on the
basis of their sex and marital status, the court drew a distinction
between indirect and direct discrimination.
97 SCt 1843 (1977) at 1844.
(1985) 2 SCR 536 at 551.
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regarded as unfair. "The deciding factor should be a person's ability to do a
job,,235
The court explained what was meant by this by quoting from another Canadian
case. In Andrews v Law Society of Britsh Columbia
236
the court said that
"distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on
the basis of assosciation with a group will rarely escape a charge of discrimination,
while those based on an individual's merits and capacities, will rarely be so
c1assed".237
This was also a significant judgment in that it addressed the issue of compensatory
measures to be awarded to plaintiffs who had been discriminated against.
Although the court did not refer specifically to indirect discrimination in this regard,
the general wording of its judgment suggests a general application of these
principles to direct as well as indirect discrimination.
The court referred to the report of the Committee of Experts on Equality in
Employment in Occupation (ILO) para 2.2.7 where it said:
Discrimination causes material and moral harm; although it may be relatively easy, as
regards discrimination in remuneration to repair the damage incurred by means of an
adjustment in the level of remuneration, back-pay and punitive damages, as evidenced by
pertinent legislation adopted in this connection in a number of countries, remedies for
discrimination in access to training, employment or occupation do not usually render
themselves to purely financial compensation ... The courts may order a variety of measures,
including the reinstatement of workers dismissed on racial grounds, the payment of back
wages, allowances and promotions of which they may have been deprived owing to the
employer's discriminatory practices. The courts may also order the employers to cease and




(1995) 16 ILJ 1048 (IC) at 1085.
(1989) 1 RCS 143.
Ibid at 144-5.
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particularly serious or has existed for a long time, these remedies do not suffice. For this
reason, the Courts have sometimes ordered, or the parties have voluntarily agreed to
undertake, affirmative action measures to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
Thus this case represented the first case in South Africa to legally acknowledge
the defence of "inherent job requirements". This was even before the enactment
of the Labour Relations Act of 1995, which subsequently included this defence.
More importantly, the interpretation of this defence was strict and excluded
business operational reasons.
Although the case did not afford a detailed explanation of the manner in which an
indirect discrimination claim could be proved, it did provide South African courts
with a precedent for indirect discrimination cases with regard to the compensatory
measures to be awarded in such cases.
The most recent case on indirect discrimination was Swart v Mr Video (Pty)
Ltd238 where the court examined the requirement that a shop-assistant be under
the age of 25. The applicant was refused the position because she was three years
older than the required age. The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration(hereafter referred to as the CCMA) stated that discrimination could only
be justified if it was based on the inherent requirements of the job. The reason
provided by the employer for the age limit was that the position required someone
who was willing to take instructions from young persons and compatibility with
young members of staff. However, the CCMA ruled that the reasoning was
insufficient to meet the "inherent requirement" defence since the applicant was
willing to work with and/or under younger people.
Although the issue of indirect discrimination was correctly identified, the case
approached the issue in far too simplistic a manner. It did little to develop the law
on indirect discrimination.
238 1997 2 BLLR 249 CCMA.
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It is clear that South Africa has a long way to go before we can describe our case
law on indirect discrimination as "developed". In a country where the workplace
is, in all probability, saturated with indirect discriminatory practices, one would
have expected a sturdy flow of complaints since the enactment of the 1995
Labour Relations Act. The above case law does not reflect this. Can the reluctant
appearance of indirect discrimination cases be attributed to the frightening notion
that South Africans have become impervious to discrimination in that we see
nothing wrong with such practices? An easier notion to accept would be that "we
must not build up an exaggerated faith in the efficacy of law"239 because
legislative enactment will not neccessarily encourage complainants to come forth.
However, only two years after the enactment of the Labour Relations Act,
speculations of this nature are perhaps premature. It is, .however, an opportune
time to encourage further legislation and proposals that will aim at preventing
indirect discrimination.
7 PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The general clause prohibiting indirect discrimination in the Constitution is
insufficient to ensure protection against discrimination. Prevention and protection
against discriminatory practices in employment can only be effectively achieved
by introducing "positive legislative support". 240 It has been said that :
....the constitutional enactment is a shield, but the victim of discrimination needs a sword




Wedderburn (1986) at 447 quoting Lustgarten.





This legislation must take the form of a separate statute that outlaws
discrimination in employment. Therefore the inclusion of the sections prohibiting
discrimination in the Labour Relations Act is also insufficient. What is required is
a comprehensive discrimination statute that ensures equity in employment and
builds on the general principles encapsulated in the Constitution Act 108 of 1996
and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The proposed statute will pertain
particularly to the workplace and will cover all grounds of discrimination. Such a
statute will also provide an indication to employers and employees that
government attaches priority to the prevention and eradication of discriminatory
practices in employment.
The South African government has recognized the need for the introduction of a
separate discrimination statute. In July of 1996, the Department of Labour
published a Green Paper on Employment and Occupational Equity.242 The Paper
contains proposals for the achievement of employment equity. These proposals
would be included in a future discrimination statute. The paper also invited
comments on these proposals.
This section examines the recommendations and proposals made by the Green
Paper for the achievement of equality in the workplace. It critically analyses these
proposals and makes further proposals for indirect discrimination legislation and
the facilitation of indirect discrimination claims.
7.1 A BRIEF APPRAISAL OF THE GREEN PAPER: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR
A":NEWEMPlOYMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL EQUITY STATUTE
The South African government's proposal of an Employment Equity Bill will
represent the -first intervention to do away with all forms of discrimination in
occupation and employment. "243 The proposals made in the Green Paper are
242
243
Green Paper: Employment Equity (1996).
Ibid at 2 (Foreword).
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broad policy proposals. There is, however the promise of more definitive proposals
which will be incorporated in a White Paper on Employment Equity in the near
future. At this stage though it is necessary to briefly examine these policy
proposals to determine the direction of future discrimination legislation.
The Green Paper focuses on the protection of three historically disadvantaged
groups: viz., black people, women and disabled persons. The inclusion of women
under this umbrella of protection is reflective of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act . 108 of 1996 where these same groups are afforded
protection. It indicates that that government as well as society acknowledge the
fact that historical disadvantages arose not only because of apartheid, but also
very significantly, because of social prejudices. This new status of women as a
"protected" group will necessitate an improvement in the status of women in the
workplace and hence in society.
A significant feature of the Green Paper is the indication by the Department of
Labour that government is aware that antidiscrimination legislation alone will not
be sufficient to protect Individuals .i?" The realisation is that South Africa is no
exception to the rest of the world in that there are various components to
employment discrimination. The most significant of these are cultural and
institutional discrimination in the workplace. It is therefore necessary to address
these growth areas of discrimination and to encourage cultural and insitutional
change in the workplace.
Thus the Green Paper proposes the following, as its central themes for the
achievment of employment equity:
1. Antidiscrimination legislation to protect individuals combined with
measures to encourage institutional and cutural change by employing
organisations.
2. Accelerating training and promotion for individuals from historically
244
The Green Paper: Employment Equity (1996) at 30.
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disadvantaged groups in this context.
3. As far as possible, mediation and arbitration to resolve disputes, with
strong legal protection against discrimination and harassrnent.i"
~he wording of the above aims indicates an intention not only to protect
\
\ individuals from existing discriminatory practices in existing workplaces, but also
II to prevent discrimination by transforming the nature of the workplace so that
i discriminatory employment practices are non-existent. This can be achieved by
J
f promoting conditions that foster employment equity for all.
A future discrimination statute aims to achieve this in the following manner. Firstly,
the Paper prohibits sexual harassment in emptovrnent.i'" This will represent the
first clause of this nature in employment legislation in South Africa and is an
indication of a commitment to protect the rights of women in the workplace.
Secondly, the Paper identifies selection and recruitment procedures as critical
areas that warrant legislative attention. 247 It advocates a "systemic
transformation of advertising procedures. "248 This transformation is hoped to be
achieved in the following manner. Advertising procedures must be reformed so
that they reach all "realistic,,249 candidates. The significance of this approach
is that advertisements should reach all candidates who possess the minimum
requirements and not only those from a particular sector of the population. To
ensure that advertisements reach all qualified candidates, the following measures
should be adopted. Firstly, the prevention of advertising in papers that reach a
limited audience and secondly, discouraging word of mouth recruitments. It is
245 Ibid.





evidently clear that one of the main aims of the future legislation will be an
avoidance of reproducing the present constitution of the workforce.
The Paper also lists a further aim of redefining criteria for employment. The
purpose of this evaluation of criteria is to ensure that the requirements that are
insisted upon for certain positions are requirements that are necessary for the job,
which means that they are legitimate, and do not represent a means of creating
"barriers" or "hurdles" in employment. This will involve a massive job analysis
campaign, the purpose of which will be to investigate the "inherent" requirements
of every position available in the South African workplace.
-:
r--... "J U'V's-v V-4-"'~T-
T~e p~pelr also advocates an emphasis on skill rather than formal educational
qualifications. .Further, it emphasises the need to recognize experience gained in
different types of organisations and institutions. It identifies the fact that possibly,
-------_._--~--------- .
seniority may operate as a discriminatory factor. It advocates the avoidance of
- P;~cho~~tri~--~e~~;--~~I·es-s--tney--accorrimoda-te- -diversity and encourages a
reappraisal of the L1FO principles that often tend to perpetuate past discrimination
policies. 25o All of the above mentioned factors indicate a policy of
accommodation of the differences and social hinderances that the disadvantaged
groups bring to the employment sector.
Most significantly, employers who, in the past were protected from discrimination
charges because the reason for the decision was unknown, will now be compelled
to afford reasons for the selection, recruitment, dismissal and so on. 25 1 This will
have the effect of rendering the decision-making process open and available for







Finally, the Paper advocates an "organisational audit". This "audit is to be
conducted by employers who will report back to the Department of Labour on a
regular basis. The purpose of this audit will be to gather information
252
which
will aid in monitoring representativeness and employment equity in various sectors
of employment. Employers will also be encouraged to use the data gathered from
. these audits to develop and adopt plans for change.
The overall indication from the Green Paper is that the clauses encapsulated in
such a statute will be of a very general nature, leaving the development of indirect
discrimination cases to the courts expertise. It has been common experience
abroad that complicated lengthy procedures deter indirect discrimination claims
and results in much confusion amongst complainants, defendants and judicial
officers. Thus it is suggested that future discrimination legislation in South Africa
provide a broad legal framework that is capable of flexibility. Following the
----~_._---,--.----
r approach in the US, a democratic South Africa should be encouraged to place a
;
1 su!!!£tenLdeg[eELo.Ltaitbjn.the-' ibe[aLln!erp-!etati~~.~!y1~._Q.tl~cour.t~-! Eg'yjRP_eJf~
.I wi~.h ~..b! .?ad l~g~1 !.~~~:~~.~k:.t~e labour courts will be in a posi tion to apply the
I principles encapsulated in the statute to individual cases. This will encourage a
l 'Oynamic quality in indirect discriminati~~-~a-w~-_. . .. .... -'"
The Paper also indicates that an "encouraging" approach to employers will be
adopted. The phrasing of the Paper in "should" rather than "must" indicates that
employers will be given the opportunity to transform the workplace through their
own initiatives and co-operate with the Department of Labour in doing so. This
reluctance to adopt an adversarial approach is understandable. Employers are more
252
This informat ion will include, inter alia: employment, pay and benefits
in the major categories of race, gender, and disability; programmes
and policies on human resource development ; organisation of work
in terms of skills and responsibilites required by different positions,
and hours worked; transport, housing and caring arrangements and
preferences of employees, by race and gender, including options of
hours worked; languages used and language competence; procedures
for hiring, training, promotion, retrenchment and transfers etc (see
The Green Paper: Employment Equity (1996) at 36).
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likely to bring about transformation with an encouraging nudge by government
rather than by the immediate introduction of punitive measures for a lack of
commitment to change. In fact, the Paper proposes to implement incentives that
will encourage employers to promote employment equity. This approach
recognizes the fact that transformation will be a timely and costly project. The
willingness of employers will aid this process.
Also, especially in the context of indirect discrimination, employers are often
unaware of the discriminatory effects of certain practices. Therefore particularly
in circumstances where there is no evidence of a discriminatory motive, employers
will benefit from assistance in removing the discriminatory practices and
implementing new ones. Further, by encouraging employers to accept guidance in
_____the form of The Code of GQ.o_d _-~r.actice,--ao~tmosphere of assistance and co-
operation will be fostered. Employers will not see themselves or be seen as the
"guilty" and would be more susceptible to accepting advice.
It is suggested, however, that this voluntary approach to employer-initiated change
should limit itself to the early stages of transformation. Having encouraged
transformation, a continuous check must be placed on the workplace and a failure
to implement suitable measures or a lack of commitment to transformation and
employment equity must be met by punitive measures against Ilguilt y" employers.
Discrimination is a serious issue and the legislative implications should also be of
a serious nature.
'''--- -----------
Lastly, the procedural proposals of the Green Paper must be examined.
The Green Paper provides an institutional framework for the implementation of a
discrimination statute. The Department of Labour will be responsible for the
implementation of the legislation. The administration of the legislation will be
conducted by two bodies. The first will be the Directorate for Equal Opportunites.
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The Directorate will develop codes of good practice that will provide guidelines to
employers on various issues such as recrui tment, selection, dismissal and
retrenchment. This body will also guide employers in formulating and implementing
policies that encourage employment equity. It will also be responsible for a
continual assessment of advances made by such policies.
The establishment of this directorate is very much in line with international trends
where commissions in the US and Britain have proved extremely effective in
developing the law of indirect discrtmination.i'" It is, however, submitted that






The provision of assistance to employees who allege discrimination. In most
instances employees will not know how to process a claim of discrimination.
This body must make this information available to employees. Further, it
must provide assistance in the processing of claims. This assistance may be
as simple as aiding in the completion of forms.
As an independent body it must provide advice and guidance to employers
as to the suitability of present employment practices and suggest cost
efficient ways to minimise discrimination.
It must be involved in training individuals who will be responsible for
enforcing legislation. There must also be training of individuals who will be
responsible for the gathering and analysing of audit data.
It must be responsible for a job analysis campaign and the training of job
analysis experts. It must set out guidelines as to what would would
incorporate an "inherent job requirement" in various circumstances.
American Employment Opportunities Commission and the British
Equal Employment Commission.
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* It must educate employees on the rights available to them in terms of the
new legislation. It must also inform employers in this respect. The analysis
of the nature of indirect discrimination claims in an earlier section has
indicated that access and knowledge of legislative protection is a necessary
feature for sucessful discrimination litigation. In most instances individuals
are unaware of the rights available to them. This problem must be
addressed.
Although the duties envisaged will place a heavy burden on this body, the
specialised nature of discrimination claims necessitates the performance of these
functions.
A further body known as the Labour Directorate will be responsible for the
enforcement of the legislation. It will regulate compliance with appropriate
procedures and will ensure that data required is returned and the necessary plans
for employment equity made.
Therefore, the Directorate for Equal Opportunities will serve an advisory function
whereas the the Labour Directorate will serve as an enforcement body. It is
submitted that this distinction in roles is extremely necessary. The need for an
independent body that can be consulted on various issues of discrimination by
employers and employees is imperative. This body must remain distinct from
enforcement in order to gain any measure of credibility amongst all stakeholders.
The establishment of these various bodies and the functions that have been
prescribed to each of them may introduce various practical problems. Firstly, the
resources of the Department of Labour are limited. The enactment of the proposed
policies will require a level of expertise that may be difficult to find. Further, the
costs involved will be great. However, one wonders to what extent this resource
deficiency will affect the full implementation of the proposed legislation. It is
suggested that administrative problems of this nature be addressed at this stage
to avoid significant problems later.
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The Paper also advocates the resolution of discrimination disputes by way of
conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Therefore all disputes must first be referred
to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediaton and Arbitration and only on appeal
is access to the Labour Court allowed. The Labour Appeal Court will be the court
of final instance. This approach is commended. It is an indication that the future
discrimination legislation will be drawn up in a manner that will be in accordance
to the general principles contained in the Labour Relations Act. This will encourage
a consistency and stability in the resolution of labour disputes. Further, it will
promote a culture of consultation and co-operation between employers and
employees.
The Green Paper, also addresses the issue of the burden of proof. Taking note of
problems experienced overseas, it advocates reducing the burden of proof of the
complainant. The Paper suggests that once a complaint of discrimination has been
registered, the employer will bear the burden of proving that the practice is not
discriminatory. This will have the effect of encouraging indirect discrimination
complaints.
An affirmative action policy has also been advocated by the Green Paper. Once
employers have conducted the required organisational audit, they will be required
to formulate an affirmative action policy. It is submitted that integral to the aim of
promoting equality for women in the workplace is an effective affirmative action
policy. The problems facing women in employment cannot be eradicated without
an attack on the root of the problem. The source of this problem is the conflicting
role of women as child rearers and responsible for domestic duties and her role as
an employee. This has resulted in a continuing conflict between the obligations at
home and at work.
The Green Paper addresses this issue by advocating a reorganisation of the
workplace in order to accommodate the obligations of women outside the working
environment. This accommodation can take the form of the provision of child care
facilities at work. This would enable women who are otherwise to limited to
97
certain hours of work to extend these hours because of the benefit of child care.
Further accommodation could take the form of job sharing or flexible work hours
that allow women to work as well as care for their home and children. Training and
educational programmes must be planned during working hours or if such
accommodation cannot be made, child care facilities outside working hours and
during training sessions should be arranged. This accommodation of the social
obligations of women should form part of an affirmative action programme.
Affirmative action programmes should not be aimed exclusively at affording
opportunity to disadvantaged groups at the threshold of employment. Selecting
women for employment and then releasing them into a "hostile" work atmosphere
would do little to "enable" women in the workplace. The problems encountered
by women in employment are experienced at every conceivable level of
employment. Therefore policies should aim at accommodating women in the
workplace.
The Green Paper has been critcised as being "a little short on deta-il in the area of
enforcement of affirmative action procedures". 254 It is submitted that the
pervasive nature of discrimination against women will necessitate the statutory
enforcement of afirmative action policies in favour of women. "The legislature
should thus impose a statutory duty to develop affirmative action. It should provide
a basic legal framework within which these specific policies could be developed
byemployers.,,255
It would be naive to assume that the implementation of a discrimination statute will
occur without several substantive and procedural problems. Moreover, the reaction
of employers to the legislation will depend on the strictness of the measures
adopted. However, this should not dissuade the implementation and enforcement
of a widely anticipated statute.
254
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Cheadle H Current Labour Law (1996) at 49.
Louw (1992) at 371.
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8 CONCLUSION
It has been stated that:
One of the fundamental human rights is the right to earn a living, free of discrimination on
. I 's ablli f 256any ground other than ones relating direct y to a person sa I Itv to per orm.
In a country that has committed itself to democracy and the preservation of human
rights, the protection and advancement of a woman's right to earn a living is a
necessary feature of any society that prides itself on the principles of equality and
fairness.
It is thus imperative that the disadvantages facing women in employment be
addressed. The stereotyping of women and the biasness that accompanies such
stereotyping continues to exist and flourish in society. The aim of indirect
discrimination legislation is not to address the inequalities and prejudices that face
women in society, but the more modest one of preventing these prejudices and
hinderances from infiltrating the workplace by "insisting that the employment
market and its practices be modified to take account of domestic
responslbiltiesr.?" It is, however, hoped that conditions that foster equity in
the workplace will encourage a change in social attitudes.
Therefore, South Africa, as it stands at the threshold of a new democratic
dispensation finds itself in a uniquely enviable position. Twenty-six years after the
landmark decision of Griggs v Duke Power CO./58 discrimination laws in South
Africa can develop with the advantage of hindsight. The lessons of our
international counterparts should prove helpful in avoiding the problems




Editors Columbia Human Rights Law Review (1973) 5 at 261.
O'Donovan K and Szyszcak E (1985) 42 at 44.
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roles of the courts in the US and Britain in interpreting indirect discrimination
clauses should also provide a valuable lesson for South African courts. Therefore
South Africa having taken the initiative to prohibit indirect discrimination by means
of the Constitutionf" and the new Labour Relations Act260 now finds itself
facing a massive task ahead to ensure that these indirect discrimination clauses as
well as future discrimination legislation do not become meaningless and inaccesible
to workers. It is for this very reason that academic research in this area of law
must be encouraged and pursued.
259
260
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
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